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MISSION REVIVAL JURISPRUDENCE: STATE COURTS
AND HISPANIC WATER LAW SINCE 1850
Peter L. Reich*
Abstract: In this Article, the author argues that after the United States' annexation of the
Southwest, state judges in California, New Mexico, and Texas knowingly distorted the
communal nature of applicable Spanish and Mexican water law. While previous scholars
have acknowledged that courts misinterpreted municipal and riparian water rights originating
in the Southwest's Hispanic period, most historians have attributed the distortion to ignorance
rather than design. Using archival sources, the author demonstrates that American judges
created an historical fiction of "Spanish" absolute water control, and intentionally disregarded
actual law and custom dictating water apportionment. The resulting doctrines of pueblo water
rights and riparian irrigation rights facilitated water monopoly and accumulation by cities and
large landowners. This intentional manipulation of Hispanic law bears implications for legal
historical debates and contemporary water allocation problems.
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However much judges liked to clothe doctrine in history and in the
costume of timeless values, doctrine was still at bottom flesh and blood,
the flesh and blood of real, contemporary struggles over goods and
positions and authority.
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The Mission Inn in Riverside, California, is a luxury hotel constructed
in 1902 to evoke "the Old California of missions and ranchos," according
to its promotional pamphlet.' Consistent with this image, the builders
filled an entire city block with arches, bell towers, flying buttresses,
domes, fountains, wrought-iron balconies, and Tiffany stained-glass
windows.2  An ornate, turn-of-the-century fan'rasy of Hispanic
architecture, the Inn is completely unlike the unornamented adobe
structures that existed in the Southwest before the Americans came.3
Similarly, late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century state courts
developed elaborate theories of water rights ostensibly based on Hispanic
law, but which bore no resemblance to actual Spanish and Mexican legal
traditions. Despite their awareness of the historical reality of communal
water-sharing practices, American judges asserted that municipal and
riparian water rights originating in the Hispanic period were absolute and
exclusive.' These doctrines of absolute water rights, legitimated water
monopoly and accumulation in the hands of a few cities and landowners.
In some states, this version of Hispanic law persists: in 1975, the
California Supreme Court reaffirmed Los Angeles's paramount "pueblo
water right" to its local watershed on the basis of stare decisis, despite
extensive trial court findings that the right had no historical basis.'
In contrast to the common law water regime of riparian and prior
appropriation rights emphasizing individual property interests,6 a
1. Mission Inn Foundation, The Story ofthe Mission Inn 2(1993).
2. Esther Klotz, The Mission Inn: Its History andArifacts 1 (1993).
3. Harold Kirker, California's Architectural Frontier 4, 9 (1960). See infra text accompanying
notes 48-54 for discussion of the "mission revival" movement as an idealized myth about Spanish
colonial civilization.
4. See discussion infra parts III and IV.
5. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975). See discussion infra
text accompanying notes 242-56.
6. Riparian doctrine, dominant in the eastern United States, provides that every landowner along a
watercourse has an appurtenant right to reasonable use of the water. 6 Robert Beck, Waters and
Water Rights 541 (1991). Appropriation doctrine, prevalent in the West, provides that water rights
arise from prior diversion and application to beneficial use. Id. at 494. Compared to the riparian
rule, prior appropriation is based on use rather than land ownership, and gives the first user an
exclusive right to a constant amount of water. Sarah F. Bates et al., Searching Out the Headwaters
147 (1993). For historical analyses of the nineteenth-century replacement or supplementation of
riparianism with appropriation in the western states, see Robert G. Dunbar, The Adaptability of
Water Law to the Aridity of the West, 24 J.W. 57 (1985) (appropriation more adapted to arid
climate), and Donald J. Pisani, Enterprise and Equity: A Critique of Western Water Law in the
Nineteenth Century, 18 W. Hist. Q. 15 (1987) (appropriation met West's economic development
needs).
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communal water system prevailed in the Hispanic Southwest.7  Legal
historians of the Spanish and Mexican periods have shown that far from
being absolute and exclusive, water rights were shared between
municipalities and other users, especially in times of shortage.8 This
communal water system also restricted the private sector, for riparian
owners did not automatically have the right to irrigate their own
property, but needed an express or implied grant of water in addition to
land.9 These communal water use patterns can be traced back to regional
sharing arrangements in medieval Spain'° and ate still practiced in parts
of the contemporary Southwest." Based on this historical evidence,
many scholars of western water law in the American period have
criticized nineteenth- and twentieth-century state courts for distorting
Hispanic traditions. 2 However, the legal historians who have attempted
to explain this distortion have attributed it to a judicial "loss of Hispanic
learning" 3 or to parties failing to present documents on Spanish and
Mexican water law to the courts. 4 None of these scholars has examined
the contemporary background of the key nineteenth- and early twentieth-
7. An area embracing the present states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Nevada, and
Utah, and portions of Colorado, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Wyoming was governed successively by
Spain from the sixteenth century to 1821, and by Mexico from 1821 to 1846 (to 1836 in the case of
Texas). David J. Weber, The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846 xv (1982).
8. Norris Hundley, The Great Thirst: Californians and Water, 1770s-1990s 39 (1992); Michael
C. Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest 157 (1984); Daniel Tyler, The Mythical Pueblo Rights
Doctrine 13, 44 (1990). See discussion infra text accompanying notes 87-89.
9. Hans W. Baade, The Historical Background of Texas Water Law-A Tribute to Jack Pope, 18
St. Mary's L.J. 1, 64, 94-95 (1986); Betty Dobkins, The Spanish Element in Texas Water Law
143-44 (1959); Meyer, supra note 8, at 119-20. See discussion infra text accompanying notes
328-31.
10. Thomas F. Glick, Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia 118-31 (1970) [hereinafter
Glick, Valencia]; Thomas F. Glick, The Old World Background of the Irrigation System of San
Antonio, Texas (1972) [hereinafter Glick, San Antonio).
11. Stanley Crawford, Mayordomo: Chronicle of an Acequia in Northern New Mexico (1988).
Crawford describes the governance of acequias (irrigation ditches) in northern New Mexico, by
which local users receive a water share in exchange for contributing to ditch maintenance. Id.
12. Baade, supra note 9, at 24 n.142, 88, 91; David Chatfield & Bruce Bertram, Water Rights of
the City of Los Angeles: Power Politics and the Courts, 6 San Fern. Valley L. Rev. 151, 153-76
(1978); Dobkins, supra note 9, at 139-58; G. Emlen Hall, Shell Games: The Continuing Legacy of
Rights to Minerals and Water on Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in the Southwest, 36 Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Inst. § 1.03 (1991); Hundley, supra note 8, at 126-35, 330-32; Wells A. Hutchins,
Pueblo Water Rights in the West, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 748, 757-58 (1960); A.R. White & Will Wilson,
The Flow and Underfiow ofMotl v. Boyd-The Conclusion, 9 Sw. L. J. 377, 431-32 (1955).
13. Baade, supra note 9, at 23, 87; Dobkins, supra note 9, at 133; Joseph W. McKnight, The
Spanish Watercourses of Texas, in Essays In Legal History in Honor of Felix Frankfurter 373, 374,
386 (M. Forbosch ed., 1966).
14. Hundley, supra note 8, at 134; White & Wilson, supra note 12, at 433.
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century cases to evaluate the context of these decisions, and none has
researched court files to determine the extent to which judges knowingly
misused Hispanic law.
Using previously untapped source material, especially court files, this
Article explains the historical reasons for the nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century judicial misinterpretation of Hispanic water law which
still burdens western water policy. Part I considers how formalistic
jurisprudence and notions of public rights influenced legal doctrine. Part
II examines how American cultural myths about the Southwest's Spanish
and Mexican past substituted images of a romantic arcadia for a more
mundane reality and may have affected judicial thinking. Part III
analyzes the adoption of the "pueblo water rights" doctrine by courts in
California and New Mexico, despite judges' knowledge that absolute
municipal water control was inconsistent with Hispanic water-sharing
traditions. Part III also contrasts these decisions with a recent Texas
decision that rejected the doctrine on the basis of historical evidence.
Part IV explains why Texas recognized riparian irrigation rights for forty
years despite courts' knowledge that such irrigation was not practiced
during the Spanish and Mexican periods. In Part V, I conclude that
American state courts knowingly distorted Hispanic law to justify
exclusive water access by growing cities and large landowners. Finally, I
explore how this misuse of historical authority casts doubt upon state
courts' integrity and illuminates the development of current water
policy."5
15. This Article omits any discussion of Arizona water law because after the Arizona territorial
legislature adopted prior appropriation in 1864, only a few subsequent courts claimed, in dicta, that
this rule derived from Hispanic traditions. See Clough v. Wing, 17 P. 453, 455-56 (Ariz. 1888)
(holding that prior appropriator could not claim more water than necessary for appropriation's
purpose and stating in dicta that prior appropriation was practiced by Native American and Hispanic
irrigators); Biggs v. Utah Irrigating Ditch Co., 64 P. 494, 499 (Ariz. 1901) (holding that prior
appropriator could lose priority by acquiescing in later use and noting in dicta that territorial code
reenacted Spanish and Mexican water law); Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 89 P. 504, 508
(Ariz. 1907), aff'd 213 U.S. 339 (1909) (claiming that riparian rights a:e inconsistent with prior
appropriation and stating in dicta that appropriation was traditional custom in the Mexican state of
Sonora). Compare James M. Murphy, The Spanish Legal Heritage in Arizona 15 (1966) (asserting
that prior appropriation followed Hispanic law) with Meyer, supra note 3, at 148 n.13 (criticizing
Murphy and maintaining that priority was merely one consideration in Hispanic water allocation).
The Arizona courts' lack of interest in Spanish or Mexican precedent may be due to the limited pre-
Conquest Hispanic influence in the area (never exceeding a population of one thousand), compared
to more densely settled California, New Mexico, and Texas. James E. Officer, Hispanic Arizona,
1536-18562-3 (1987).
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I. JURISPRUDENTIAL FORMALISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF
PUBLIC RIGHTS.
The seaxch for reasons behind the judicial misinterpretation of
Hispanic law should begin with a discussion of general doctrinal trends
in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century jurisprudence. Following
the Civil War, America entered an era marked by rapid economic
growth, the application of Darwinism to social theory, and government
promotion of major private industries through subsidies and eminent
domain.'6 In public opinion, the antebellum optimism about national
development was replaced by a general cultural anxiety, with life being
seen as a struggle for access to a limited pie. 7 Judges viewed their role
as reconciling the often conflicting interests of corporate and legislative
power.'8 Different legal historical schools have attempted to characterize
the judicial decisions of this period, offering possible models for
explaining the distortion of Hispanic law.
One group sees the era as being characterized by "formalism" or
"classical legal consciousness," a belief that case results were dictated by
an abstract structure of private and public spheres, within which power
could be exercised absolutely.' The absolute private sphere was
delineated by such cases as Lochner v. New York," which struck down
maximum-hour legislation as interfering with contractual freedom.
16. Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History 190-94 (1989).
17. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History ofAmerican Law 338 (2d ed. 1985).
18. Morton Keller, Affairs of State: Public Life in Late Nineteenth Century America 350, 367
(1977).
19. Charles C. Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 Am. J. Legal Hist. 221 (1980);
Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of
Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in 3 Res. L. & Soc'y 3 (1980); Elizabeth Mensch,
The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in The Politics ofLaw: A Progressive Critique 13, 18-21
(David Kairys ed. 1990); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960
9-31 (1992) [hereinafter Horwitz, Transformation 11]. Morton Horwitz sees formalism originating
as a reaction to antebellum judicial "instrumentalism," by which pragmatic judges restricted vested
rights in order to foster commercial and industrial development. Morton J. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 253-54 (1977) [hereinafter Horwitz, Transformation
1]. Once wealth had been redistributed from farmers and workers to a new entrepreneurial elite, the
latter group sought to justify their gains with the formalistic notion that legal rules were apolitical
and inevitable. Id. at 254. William Nelson considers that instrumentalism was supplanted by
formalism due to the antislavery movement's promotion of a more principle-oriented jurisprudence.
William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in
Nineteenth Century America, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1974). At least one scholar, Harry Scheiber, has
criticized the instrumentalism/formalism dichotomy as an oversimplification. Harry N. Scheiber,
Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American "Styles of Judicial
Reasoning" in the 19th Century, 1975 Wisc. L. Rev. 1.
20. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Decisions like Mugler v. Kansas,2" which upheld uncompensated
prohibitions on liquor sales as traditionally within a state's police power,
illustrated the scope of the public realm.' Formalism conveyed the
message that these spheres of power were objective rather than
politically based, and that existing power relations were therefore
legitimate while governmental resource redistribution was not.23
Although southwestern state courts began to cite Hispanic law in support
of absolute municipal water control during the late nineteenth century,
scholars have not yet considered whether these cases might be
characterized as formalistic.
Another group of legal historians focuses on the late nineteenth
century as a period of emerging "public rights" concepts.24 They view
the judiciary as playing a key role in allocating natural resources for the
general benefit25 and in mobilizing the doctrines of police power, public
trust, and public purpose to limit vested rights in favor of a broader
community interest.26 In California mining law, for example, the courts
applied a "reasonable use" test to prevent water monopolization and
pollution by prior appropriators27 and invoked the public trust over
navigable waters to enjoin hydraulic mining with its consequent
flooding.28 Unlike the analysts of formalism, some of the public rights
21. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
22. Horwitz, Transformation 11, supra note 19, at 28-30. See also Mensch, supra note 19 at 20
(citing additional examples of absolute sphere analysis).
23. Mensch, supra note 19, at 21; Horwitz, Transformation 11, supra note 19, at 10, 11, 16. In
Horwitz's view, the purported objectivity of formalism was related to the ideal of a neutral state as
psychologically reassuring in an era of social conflict and inequality. Id. at 20.
24. Friedman, supra note 17, at 340-41; Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land
Law Development in California, 1850-1866: A Case Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in
Nineteenth-Century America, 10 L. & Soc'y Rev. 235 (1976); Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and
the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 217 (1984); Molly Selvin, This Tender
and Delicate Business: The Public Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy,
1789-1920 170-407 (1987).
25. Friedman, supra note 17, at 341; McCurdy, supra note 24.
26. Scheiber, supra note 24; Selvin, supra note 24. Although these three concepts overlap as
developed by successive courts, Harry Scheiber generally uses "po'ice power" to refer to
government regulation of private property, "public trust" for government control of certain natural
resources, and "public purpose" for the taking (through eminent domain) or taxation of property for
the benefit of private instrumentalities having a public character, such as bridges or railroads.
Scheiber, supra note 24, at 223-26.
27. See cases cited in McCurdy, supra note 24, at 260-62.
28. Woodruffv. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753 (9th Cir. 1884). See discussion
in Scheiber, supra note 24, at 239-40. Arguably, the "public rights" rubric begs the question of who
really benefited: the general population or selected large enterprises. See Harry N. Scheiber,
Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government, 1789-1910, in American
Vol. 69:869, 1994
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historians have discussed the judicial application of Hispanic law,
viewing the California pueblo water right as a precursor to the modem
public trust doctrine because both appear to be rooted in community
access to resources.29 However, they have uncritically assumed the
pueblo right to be historically based,3" and have not analyzed why judges
used it so often to permit resource accumulation.
Thus, both of these interpretations of late nineteenth-century doctrinal
trends offer possibilities for explaining the judicial use of Hispanic law.3'
The formalism model may be somewhat more promising than that of
public rights to the extent that the Hispanic law decisions reflect an
absolutist view of water control.32 The public rights school has
uncritically failed to see the Hispanic law cases as distortions, and
although these rulings may have been perceived by some to be in the
public interest, it is not clear that exclusive municipal water control and
riparian irrigation necessarily benefited the general population.
Understanding the reasons for judicial misinterpretation of Hispanic
water law requires examination of historical sources beyond the
published opinions usually employed by those who have identified
formalist and public rights rhetoric.33 We need to look at attitudes
towards Hispanic culture that may have influenced judges, and
specifically the extent to which these notions can be found in arguments
presented to the courts making the decisions.
Law and the Constitutional Order 132, 138-40 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds.,
1988) (railroads, mining companies, and irrigated farms were the primary beneficiaries of eminent
domain devolution). See also Horwitz, Transformation I, supra note 19, at xiv (post-New Deal
"consensus" historians, who argued that American history has been characterized far more by
government intervention than laissez-faire, were uninterested in asking in whose interest regulation
took place).
29. Scheiber, supra note 24, at 225,240; Selvin, supra note 24, at 219-25.
30. Scheiber, supra note 24, at 225; Selvin, supra note 24, at 224. See also Scheiber's assertion
that the public trust doctrine was "imported out of Spanish law." Gordon Bakken et al., Western
Legal History: Where Are We and Where Do We Go From Here?, 3 W. Legal Hist. 115, 141 (1990).
31. Of course, some historians of American law in this period do not fall neatly into either of
these theoretical schools, but present data eclectically without attempting to conform to any
particular model. See, e.g., Gordon M. Bakken, The Development of Law on the Rocky Mountain
Frontier (1983); Hall, supra note 16, at 189-246.
32. Along these lines, one scholar has explained current California water law as a result of a
narrow, nineteenth-century concept of absolute riparian rights rather than a view of water as a
discrete resource for allocation in society's best interest. Eric T. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin and the
Common Law Burdens of Modern Water Law, 57 Colo. L. Rev. 485 (1986).
33. One exception to this methodological limitation is Charles Goetsch, who uses unpublished
journals and letters to elucidate the formalist thought of Connecticut Supreme Court Chief Justice
Simeon Baldwin. Goetsch, supra note 19, at 224-25.
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II. SPANISH COLONIAL REVIVALISM AS A CULTURAL
FANTASY
The cultural attitudes of American transplants to the late nineteenth-
century Southwest may be a more specific source of judicial
interpretations of Hispanic law. Many original Anglo travelers and
settlers in the Mexican Southwest regarded Hispanic inhabitants with
contempt.3 4 After the American Conquest, the new Anglo elite idealized
a romantic "Spanish" past through novels, promotional literature, public
pageants, and real estate subdivisions, while contemporary Hispanic
people remained economically and racially subordinated." Historian
Hubert Howe Bancroft captured this nostalgic view in 1888 when he
wrote of pre-Gold Rush California that "[n]ever before or since was there
a spot in America where life was a long happy holiday, where there was
less labor, less care or trouble ... the gathering of nature's fruits being
the chief burden of life, and death coming without decay, like a gentle
sleep."36 A recent analysis summarizes the myth as one of "Old World
aristocrats living the indolent, simple, and gracious life in an ambiance of
casas and courtyards, mission bells and quaint adobe houses, halcyon
days and starry nights; in places old-mission or small town or
hacienda-populated with kindly friars, dashing caballeros, venerable
dons and charming, beautiful sefioritas and happy, childlike frolicking
villagers."37
Scholars have ascribed the Anglo obsession with an imaginary
Spanish heritage to transplants' need to establish cultural traditions as
quickly as possible,38 to the frustrated rejection by New England
34. James D. Hart, American Images of Spanish California 5-22 (1960); David J. Langum, From
Condemnation to Praise, 61 Cal. Hist. 282 (1983); Patricia Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest
240-41 (1987).
35. See James W. Byrkit, Land, Sky, and People: The Southwest Defined, 34 J. Sw. 257, 345,
355-56 (1992) (noting that novels and travel books promoted Southwest as exotic despite reality of
the region's rapid industrialization); Carey McWilliams, North From Mexico: The Spanish-Speaking
People of The United States 35-47 (1968) (contrasting Anglo-sponsored 'Spanish fiestas" with the
slight Hispanic civic representation as late as the 1940s); Earl Pomeroy, The Pacific Slope 388
(1965) (noting that fiestas and residential developments used "Castilitin" imagery while actual
Hispanics were subject to low wages and racially restrictive covenants).
36. Hubert Howe Bancroft, California Pastoral, 1769-1848 179-80 (1888).
37. Byrkit, supra note 35, at 352.
38. Franklin Walker, A Literary History of Southern California 121-23 (1950). Walker refers to
this rapid process of creating a new past as "cultural hydroponics," analogizing to the agricultural
method of growing crops quickly without any soil. Id. at 121.
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"Mugwumps" of Gilded Age materialism, 39 and, particularly in Southern
California, to the search by real estate and tourism boosters for an image
of stability in the aftermath of the 1880s' land boom and collapse.4"
Whatever their origins, these romantic notions bore little resemblance to
historical reality.
The best known aspect of the Spanish myth was a preoccupation with
eighteenth-century Catholic missions, particularly in California. The
essence of this "mission myth" was that the missions were "spectacularly
successful in Christianizing and civilizing a mass of stupid, ignorant, and
savage Indians."' Propagated by literature like the novel Ramona
(1884),42 the guidebook In and Out of the Old Missions of California
(1905), 4' and the long-running theatrical production "The Mission Play"
(1912-38), 4" the legend obscures the documented historical reality that
Native Americans were treated cruelly and suffered a drastic population
decline during Spanish and Mexican rule.45 In the 1890s, California real
estate and tourism boosters realized the missions' commercial
possibilities, and so launched a preservation movement to restore the
now crumbling buildings.46 Charles F. Lummis, promoter and president
of the "Landmarks Club," epitomized the cynicism of this effort when he
39. Byrkit, supra note 35, at 345-56. Byrkit defines "Mugwumps" as patrician descendants of
old New England families who deplored the corruption of post-Civil War politics by industrialist
"Robber Barons," deserted the Republican party in 1884, and created an escapist literature idealizing
the antebellum South and the Hispanic Southwest as genteel, pre-commercial societies. Id. The term
"Mugwump" is thought to refer to a mythical bird who, like liberal Republicans unhappy with their
own party, sat with his "mug" on one side of the fence and his "wump" on the other. Id. at 345.
40. John 0. Pohlmann, California's Mission Myth 8 (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
U.C.L.A.).
41. Id. at 1.
42. Helen Hunt Jackson, Ramona (1884). The novel chronicles the dispossession and
maltreatment of Native Americans and "old Spanish families" by greedy Anglo settlers. Other
examples of fiction in this genre include Gertrude Atherton, The Californians (1898) [hereinafter
Californians), and Gertrude Atherton, The Splendid Idle Forties (1902).
43. George Wharton James, In and Out of the Old Missions ofCalifornia (1905). James extols
the architectural and social virtues of the twenty-one California missions, praising their Franciscan
founders for bringing civilization to the Pacific coast. Id.
44. The play is summarized, with quotations, in Marshall Breeden, The Romantic Southland of
California 41-58 (1928). Set in San Diego and spanning the Hispanic period from 1769 through the
1840s, "The Mission Play" is a series of vignettes depicting kindly Franciscan friars and grateful
Indians. Id. See also Kevin Starr, Inventing the Dream 87-89 (1985).
45. See James A. Sandos, Junipero Serra 's Canonization and the Historical Record, 93 Am. Hist.
Rev. 1253, 1257-59, 1262-63 (1988) (summarizing anthropological literature on corporal
punishment, poor diet, disease, and fugitivism in California missions). See also Hart, supra note 34,
at 32 (noting parallel between late nineteenth-century images of chivalrous Hispanic protection of
Indians and contemporaneous sentimentality about contented slaves in antebellum South).
46. Pohlmann, supra note 40, at 2.
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wrote that "'the old missions are worth more money, are a greater asset,
to Southern California than our oil, our oranges, even our climate!'...
[A] man is a poor fool who thinks he can do business without
sentiment."47
The idealization of the mission period was most tangibly embodied in
the "mission revival" architecture prevalent in the Southwest from the
1880s through the present.4" While the original missions were stark
adobe structures with minimal ornamentation, architects now designed
resort hotels, theaters, railroad depots, universities, and shopping centers
with elaborate fountains, balconies, bell towers, curving stairways,
domes, and red tile roofs!' The style began in California, Arizona, New
Mexico, Texas and Florida, but ultimately became a nationwide
phenomenon, even influencing areas with no Hispanic links like
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York and
Washington." Mission revival was so influential that it became the basis
for entire planned communities, some of which still mandate it by
municipal ordinance.5' In Santa Fe, New Mexico, an ironic conflict has
ensued between the city's rigid adobe-style zoning code and the
nonconforming houses of working-class Hispanics.52 As with other
aspects of the Spanish myth, mission revival architecture was created by
Anglo elites and served their economic desire to promote commercial
growth as well as their psychological need to ancho:c themselves in a
tradition.' Frank Miller, the proprietor of Riverside's elaborate Mission
47. Charles F. Lummis, Stand Fast Santa Barbara! 5 (1923) (quoting, itn part, the president of the
Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, John S. Mitchell). See also Charles F. Lummis, Preservation
of Missions Neglected by State, 8 Touring Topics 7 (1916). The standard work on Lummis and his
promotional efforts is Edwin R. Bingham, Charles F. Lummis, Editor of the Southwest (1955).
48. Architectural historians technically divide the style into two phases, mission revival
(approximately 1880s-1920s), and Spanish colonial revival (1910s-1930s), with New Mexico
"Pueblo" and Pre-Columbian Maya offshoots. David Gebhard, The Spanish Colonial Revival in
Southern California (1895-1930), 26 . Soc'y Architectural Hist. 131, 131-32, 145 (1967).
49. Id. at 131-32; Kirker, supra note 3, at 4, 9; Lawrence Cheek, Taco Deco: Spanish Revival
Revived, 32 J. Sw. 491, 491-92; James W. Steely, Spanish Mission Revival in Twentieth-Century
Architecture, in Hispanic Texas: A Historical Guide 95 (Helen Simons and Cathryn A. Hoyt eds.,
1992).
50. Gebhard, supra note 48, at 134 n.14; David Gebhard, Architectural Imagery, the Mission and
California, I Harv. Architectural Rev. 137, 139 (1980); David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in
North America 353 (1992); Karen 3. Weitze, California's Mission Revival 103, 106, 124-26, 130
(1984).
51. Gebhard, supra note 48, at 131, 138. See, e.g., San Diego, Cal., Mun. Code § 103.028(A)
(1990); Santa Barbara, Cal. Mun. Code § 22.22.104 (1993).
52. V.B. Price, A City at the End of the World 44 (1992).
53. Gebhard, supra note 50, at 138; Cheek, supra note 49, at 496-97.
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Inn, expressed both goals when he said that "if you aren't in some
business that you can idealize, you'd better change your work or else
jump off."54
But the mission was not the only Hispanic institution subjected to
romanticization. Contemporary cities were seen as heirs to Spanish
towns, or "pueblos." '55 Late nineteenth-century historians identified the
founding of certain southwestern municipalities with "Spanish" or
"Castilian" settlers, despite their knowledge that many early colonists
were of mixed Indian and African-American, as well as of Hispanic,
descent. 6 Towns throughout the Southwest took pride in their Spanish
origins. The school superintendent of Ysleta, Texas, asserted in a letter
to historian Hubert Howe Bancroft that his hamlet was "the oldest town
in the United States,"57 a title also claimed by boosters of Santa Fe, New
Mexico for that city. 8 The 1871 official history of San Jose, California
had to be content with describing it as "the most ancient pueblo in the
state."59 Beginning in the 1890s, cities' obsession with their Spanish
(rather than Mexican) past was manifested in commercially sponsored
"Spanish fiestas" lasting several days, with "Spanish" food being served,
"Spanish" music being played, and "Spanish" costumes being worn.6
54. Frank Miller, quoted in Zona Gale, Frank Miller of Mission Inn 110 (1938).
55. A further image, not focused on here because of its only indirect relevance to the water cases,
was that of the Mexican period stockraising ranch, or "rancho." Novelists like Gertrude Atherton
glorified the ranchero lifestyle as one of "Arcadian magnificence, troubled by few cares, a life of
riding over vast estates clad in silk and lace, botas and sombrero, mounted on steeds as gorgeously
caparisoned as themselves." Californians, supra note 42, at 10. See also Tirey L. Ford, Dawn and
the Dons 102-10 (1926). In fact, most rancho owners were not wealthy enough for ostentation, and
generally worked long days alongside their families. Federico Sdnchez, Rancho Life in Alta
California, in Regions of La Raza: Changing Interpretations of Mexican American Regional History
and Culture 213, 229-30 (Antonio Rios-Bustamante et al. eds. 1993).
56. In 1886, Hubert Howe Bancroft described the 1781 founders of Los Angeles as "Indian and
negro with here and there a trace of Spanish." Hubert Howe Bancroft, 1 History of California 345
(1886). However, two years later, he considered that California towns were "peopled by the old
Spanish or creole soldiers.' Bancroft, supra note 36, at 353. Frank Blackrnar quoted Bancroft on the
1781 settlers, and then without any citation claimed that "there came to live in Los Angeles a better
class of inhabitants, chiefly of old Castilian blood." Frank W. Blackmar, Spanish Institutions of the
Southivest 182-83 (1891).
57. Letter from D.E. Hunter to H.H. Bancroft (November 12, 1885) (Bancroft Library, U.C.
Berkeley).
58. Ronald L. Grimes, Symbol and Conquest: Public Ritual and Drama in Santa Fe 186 (1976).
59. Frederic Hall, The History of San Jose and Surroundings iii (1871).
60. Carey McWilliams describes such celebrations in Los Angeles, Tucson, and Santa Barbara.
McWilliams, supra note 35, at 36-40. "La Fiesta de Los Angeles" was launched in 1893 by the local
Merchants Association in order to stimulate trade. Dudley Gordon, Charles F. Lummis: Crusader In
Corduroy 298 (1972). Santa Fe's fiesta was similarly begun as a promotion in 1919. See S. Omar
Barker, The End of the Trail Fiesta, When History Re-lives in Our Oldest Capital, 81 Overland
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The revision of history in these events was epitomized in 1963 when a
"protector" of the Los Angeles Mexican-American community was
chosen because his ancestor was Hernando Cortrs, Spanish conqueror of
Mexico. 6' According to one local leader, this was "like naming one of
King George's descendants as a 'protector' of the descendants of
American revolutionists." 62 As with architecture, The fiesta trend has
even taken root in places with no Hispanic origins, such as Anglo-
founded Phoenix.
3
Paralleling the Anglo search for Spanish municipal traditions was the
idea that Hispanic water systems provided a model for the development
of cities and large-scale agriculture. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, promoters such as William Smythe argued for
planned public works and irrigation as the key to making the arid West
productive.' In an influential historical treatise, Irrigation Development
(1886), California's State Engineer William Hammond Hall investigated
comparative water use in the Mediterranean civilizations of France, Italy,
and Spain, arguing that California could learn valuable lessons about the
benefits of irrigation. Hall claimed specifically tha: in medieval Spain,
"waters were held by municipalities . . . and controlled by town
officials," and further, that "running waters available for irrigation...
belonged to the towns, notwithstanding apportionment. 66 Hall followed
Monthly 9, 10 (1923) (quoting an eyewitness description of the Santa Fe Fiesta: "[O]nce again the
old adobe walls of the Ancient Capital of the Kingdom and Provinces of New Mexico are shadowed
by the waving of plumes and the passing of stiff-necked knights in shining armor....").
61. Ruben Salazar, Spanish-Speaking Angelenos: A Culture in Search of a Name, L.A. Times,
Feb. 24, 1963, at Cl, C3.
62. Quoted in id.
63. Work Projects Administration, Arizona, A State Guide 217 (1940).
64. Smythe edited a journal, Irrigation Age, from 1891 to 1895, authored The Conquest of Arid
America (1899), and produced a column, "20th Century West" in Charles Lummis's magazines Land
of Sunshine and Out West from 1901 to 1904. Bingham, supra note 47, at 144-51; Donald J. Pisani,
From the Family Farm to Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade in California and the West,
1850-1931 343-44 (1984). See also Henry A. Wallace, Henry A. Wallace's Irrigation Frontier: On
the Trail of the Corn Belt Farmer, 1909 (Richard Lowitt and Judith Fabry eds., 1991) (containing
the future U.S. Secretary of Agriculture's observations on western irrigation and its potential for
creating rural prosperity).
65. William Hammond Hall, Irrigation Development 15 (1886). Hall cxtolled "the charm of a life
amidst a sub-tropical foliage which irrigation there supports in abundance." Id. at 6. See also Kevin
Starr's analysis that Hall was making an "implicit cultural argument" that California could
"transform itself through irrigation into a comparably civilized neo-Mediterranean commonwealth."
Kevin Starr, Material Dreams: Southern California Through the 1920s 12 (1990).
66. Id. at 370-71. This description is contradicted by a thorough modem monograph, which
maintains that medieval Spanish authorities apportioned water on a regional basis. Glick, Valencia,
supra note 10, at 118-31.
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up his historical study with a detailed report on public water works in
Southern California, asserting that at its founding, Los Angeles was
given "exclusive control" of the Los Angeles River,67 and that other
pueblos, such as San Juan Capistrano, possessed their own water titles as
well.68 Hubert Howe Bancroft echoed Hall's conclusions when he stated
that the pueblos were "entitled ... to all needed wood and water."'69
In the late nineteenth-century popular mind, some of these Hispanic
"water rights" began to take on legendary proportions. One speaker at an
1890 Los Angeles Historical Society event claimed that the city had
"exercised and enjoyed exclusive control of all the water and all of the
bed of the river within its limits so long that the memory of no living
man runs to the contrary."7 In 1899 Los Angeles City Attorney H.T.
Lee remarked that he was "impressed with the persistence and
vehemence of the contention of the citizens of the old pueblo that they
owned the water supplied to the city. The city has owned the water since
the town was nothing but a Mexican village."'7' Arizona's irrigation laws
were said to be derived from "the written and unwritten law of Mexico,
handed down from the civilization of the Tigris, Euphrates and Nile."'
These ideas would become useful to city councils and agriculturists
seeking secure water supplies for future development.73
In the context of Anglo elites' romanticism about the Hispanic period,
it is only natural that ideas about Spanish law were affected. Prior to the
Conquest, Anglo immigrants to Mexican California criticized its legal
system as corrupt and indulgent because of its mandatory conciliaci6n
(arbitration) and lack of statutory formality.74 As with other Hispanic
institutions, law was perceived differently once the Americans were in
power, especially in the late nineteenth century. In an 1887
bibliographical survey, a member of the Los Angeles bar lauded the
"wise code" of Spain's medieval monarch Alfonso X, and urged lawyers
67. William Hammond Hall, Irrigation in California (Southern) 558-59 (1888).
68. Hall considered San Juan Capistrano's title to be "without flaw or blemish." Id. at 643.
69. Bancroft, supra note 36, at 249.
70. C.P. Dorland, The Los Angeles River-Its History and Ownership, 3 Ann. Publication Hist.
Soc'y S. Cal. 31 (1893).
71. Henry T. Lee, quoted in L.A. Times, Aug. 18, 1899, at 13.
72. Charles Trumbull Hayden, quoted in Phoenix Daily Herald, Feb. 9, 1891, at 3.
73. See Bates et al., supra note 6, at 32, 41 (western cities and large-scale irrigators required water
for rapid expansion at turn of century).
74. David J. Langum, Law and Community on the Mexican California Frontier 146-51, 268-77
(1987). Langum's monograph is a detailed study of California's legal system during the Mexican
period, focusing mainly on commercial law and procedure.
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in the former Spanish possessions to study prior laws because they
"affected to a certain extent the legislation of our own times."7 5 A more
panegyrical account alleged that the informal courts run by alcaldes
(mayors) were "honest in their administration of justice and sought to
give every man his due."7 6 On into the twentieth century, Hispanic law
had its defenders in the bar, such as a prominent Dallas attorney who
praised Texas's civil law heritage as "the product of the greatest lawyers
of the ages," compared with the "crudities" of the common law.77 Anglo
lawyers themselves participated in the romantic revival, with some
promoting Spanish pueblo origins in local histories78 and others
contributing to more general Hispanic cultural projects such as the
Southwest Museum near Los Angeles.79
Thus, the Hispanic romantic revival in the Southwest encompassed
ideas about missions, architecture, municipal origins, water control, and
law. Especially given attorneys' participation in the movement, the
judges deciding water cases may have been influenced by a cultural
context in which everything "Spanish" was idealized. What is less
immediately clear is the extent to which the courts kmowingly distorted
Hispanic law for policy purposes.
III. PUEBLO WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA, NEW MEXICO,
AND TEXAS
In the 1880s, Southwestern state courts began to incorporate
romanticized ideas about Hispanic law into published decisions on
municipal water rights and riparian irrigation. Exarnination of the case
75. George Butler Griffin, A Brief Bibliographical Sketch, I Ann. Publication Hist. Soc'y S. Cal.
36,45 (1887).
76. Nellie Van De Grill Sanchez, Spanish Arcadia 361 (1929).
77. Clarence Wharton, Early Judicial History of Texas, 12 Tex. L. Rev. 311 (1934). Wharton
extolled civil law as "the finished system of the Romans, who ruled the warld for centuries and were
the greatest law givers this world has ever seen," while the common law was the product of "feudal
barbarism," treated women as mere property, and was responsible -for the "bunglesome and
inefficient jury system." Id.
78. Hall, supra note 59, at 333-49; H.C. Hopkins, History of San Diego, Its Pueblo Lands and
Water 217-61 (1929).
79. W.W. Robinson, Lawyers of Los Angeles 125 (1959). The mueum, founded by Charles
Lummis in 1912, was devoted to preserving Native American and colonial Spanish artifacts, and
attracted the support of prominent attorneys such as Henry W. O'Melveny of the O'Melveny and
Myers law firm. Id. at 125, 229-30. At least two contributors to the museum, Walter Van Dyke and
H.T. Lee, figured in several Los Angeles pueblo water cases as judge and lawyer, respectively. See
Letter from Charles F. Lummis to Judge Walter Van Dyke (November 21, 1905); Letter from H.T.
Lee to Charles F. Lummis (May 24, 1907) (both in Southwest Museum Collection, Los Angeles).
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files further reveals that state courts adopted these idealized notions
despite the presentation by losing attorneys of historically accurate
descriptions of water usage during the Hispanic period. That judges
chose the romantic over the historical version can only lead to the
conclusion that their misinterpretation was deliberate. The most
dramatic of these distortions was the "pueblo water rights" doctrine,
developed by the supreme courts of California and New Mexico.
Along with the mission and the military presidio (fort), the pueblo, or
civil municipality, was a Spanish and Mexican institutional instrument
for the colonization of the northern frontier."° Towns were usually laid
out around a central plaza faced by official and church buildings, with
surrounding lots distributed to the colonists, and private fields, common
lands, and other municipal property placed on the fringes.8 ' Some
pueblos had an elaborate municipal government, including an
ayuntamiento or cabildo (town council), alcalde (mayor), and alcaldes
ordinarios (judges), while smaller, less formal settlements had a more
abbreviated system. 2 Most of these communities were founded by the
Spanish, including Santa Fe (1610), El Paso (1680), Albuquerque (1706),
San Antonio (1731), Laredo (1767), San Jos6 (1777), and Los Angeles
(1781).83 Others originated during the Mexican period as presidial
settlements such as Tucson (1825) 84 and San Diego (1835),85 or
community land grants such as Las Vegas, New Mexico (1835).86
Hispanic municipalities did not have absolute or exclusive water
rights, but were required to share water with other users, especially in
times of drought. Since agriculture was crucial to overall development,
the regional authorities did not allow towns to monopolize water for their
own expansion.88 Rather, provincial and territorial governors regularly
80. Gilbert 1L Cruz, Let There Be Towns: Spanish Municipal Origins in the American Southwest,
1610-1810 165 (1988). As a general term, "pueblo" was used to describe any town, but in a more
limited sense implied certain jurisdictional and administrative rights. Id. at 201 n.7.
8 1. Weber, supra note 50, at 320. Weber notes that this orderly pattern was often modified on the
frontier. Id.
82. Cruz provides an overview of town administration in its most complete version. Cruz, supra
note 80, at 144-64. Some hamlets had only ajustice of the peace and two other officials. Officer,
supra note 15, at 118.
83. Cruz, supra note 80, at 25,34,47,64,96, 111, 117.
84. Officer, supra note 15, at 17.
85. Weber, supra note 7, at 30.
86. Malcolm Ebright, Land Grants and Lawsuits in Northern New Mexico 171 (1994).
87. Hundley, supra note 8, at 39; Meyer, supra note 8, at 157; Tyler, supra note 8, at 13, 44.
88. Tyler, supra note 8, at 36.
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apportioned water between pueblos and other consumers, such as
missions and individual farmers."
Struggles over water continued after the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo transferred sovereignty over most of the Southwest to the United
States.9" The treaty's provision protecting property rights established
under Mexican law9' often resulted in successor cities to the Hispanic
pueblos vying for water supplies against land grant holders, particularly
in the rapidly growing state of California.92 American courts, as we shall
see, viewed water rights in far more absolute terms than had the Spanish
and Mexican authorities.
A. California
An 1860 visitor to Los Angeles remarked, "We are on this plain about
twenty miles from the sea and fifteen from the mountains, a most lovely
locality; all that is wanted naturally to make it a paradise is water, more
water."93 In the half-century following California's statehood in 1850,
Los Angeles's population grew from 1610 to 102,000), and its area from
twenty-eight to forty-three square miles, as the old Mexican ranching
economy gradually gave way to commercial agriculture, real estate, light
manufacturing, and service industries." This expansion strained the
traditional water supply, the Los Angeles River, especially because the
89. For specific examples of accommodations, see Dobkins, supra ncte 9, at 115 (San Antonio
settlers and nearby missions); Hundley, supra note 8, at 50-56 (Los Angeles and San Fernando
mission); Meyer, supra note 8, at 159 (Monterrey and orchard owner); Officer, supra note 15, at
72-73 (Tucson and Indians); Tyler, supra note 8, at 35-36 (Taos and farmers). The criteria for the
resolution of water disputes included just title, prior use, need, avoiding injury to third parties,
reason for use, legal right, and the common good. Meyer, supra note 8, at 145-64.
90. By the treaty, ending the 1846-1848 Mexican War, the United States obtained the present
states of California, Nevada, and Utah, most of Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico, and the
southern strip of Texas between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers. 9 Stat. 922 (1848). See Richard
Griswold Del Castillo, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of Conflict (1990) (analyzing
the treaty and its ramifications).
91. Article VIII, 9 Stat. at 929-30. See Federico M. Cheever, Comment, A New Approach to
Mexican Land Grants and the Public Trust Doctrine: Defining the Proper), Interest Protected by the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1364 (1986) (discussing the property interest
protected by the treaty).
92. See discussion infra this part.
93. William H. Brewer, Up and Down California in 1860-1864 13 (Francis P. Farquhar ed.,
1974) (emphasis in original).
94. Robert M. Fogelson, The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles, 1850-1930 21-23, 78, 226
(1967).
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city periodically experienced severe droughts95 and needed adequate fire
protection for the wood buildings that had replaced adobe brick
structures.96 Attempting to make water distribution more efficient, the
city in 1868 leased its water system for thirty-three years to a private
company, which began to replace the venerable zanjas (open water
ditches) with larger reservoirs and iron pipes.97
But the city was not the only claimant to the river. By the 1870s,
upstream landowners in the San Fernando Valley were diverting water,
thus threatening Los Angeles's municipal supply and its revenue from
selling surplus water to nonurban users.98 In 1874, the city responded to
this problem by convincing the state legislature to approve a charter
amendment granting Los Angeles exclusive ownership of all the water
flowing in the Los Angeles river.99 Simultaneously, the city initiated the
first of a series of lawsuits designed to elevate its water rights above
those of all others.
In the 1879 decision of City of Los Angeles v. Baldwin,00 the
California Supreme Court rejected the city's initial attempt to establish
an absolute and exclusive right to the river. Baldwin involved the
owners of several portions of the former Rancho Los Feliz, upstream
from Los Angeles, who were diverting water for irrigation." 1 The city
sued to quiet title to the river, making the expansive claim that the
Spanish pueblo "was, from its first settlement, the owner of... all of the
water flowing in said river of Los Angeles," and that the American
municipality had succeeded to this right.102 In support of its position,
Los Angeles produced documents from 1810 showing that, in a dispute
between the pueblo and San Fernando Mission, the latter agreed to
remove an irrigation dam it had placed upstream. 3 A repetition of this
controversy in 1844 was resolved when the alcalde of Los Angeles and
95. Vincent Ostrom, Water & Politics: A Study of Water Policies and Administration in the
Development of Los Angeles 38 (1953). See Los Angeles Rainfall 1878-1993, L.A. Times, Jan. 5,
1994, at B2 (detailing variation in annual rainfall totals).
96. Hundley, supra note 8, at 122; Ostrom, supra note 95, at 46.
97. Ostrom, supra note 95, at 44. The zanjas were satisfactory for a small Hispanic population of
ranchers and agriculturalists but did not lend themselves to sanitation, flood control, or water
preservation during drought. Id. at 37-40; Hundley, supra note 8, at 122.
98. Hundley, supra note 8, at 124.
99. 1874 Cal. Stat. ch. 447, art. 2, § 1. See Ostrom, supra note 95, at 33-34 (discussing the
amendment).
100. 53 Cal. 469 (1879).
101. Id. at470.
102. Transcript on Appeal from 17th Dist. Ct. at 89, Baldwin (No. 6040).
103. Id. at 46-47.
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the mission's priest "drank some wine together ... and arranged the
matter," with the newer dam also being dismantled.' Baldwin and the
other landowner defendants countered with eyewitness testimony that
farmers had been irrigating the area of Rancho Los Feliz from the
Spanish period onward, "without being molested by anyone," including
city officials."'5 The trial court held for the defendanis, finding that they
were merely using an amount of water to which they were reasonably
entitled as riparian proprietors, and that Los Angeles had shown no grant
of ownership to the river's waters."°
On appeal, the city omitted mention of the 1844 "wine deal" (probably
because such an ad hoc allocation undercut its claim of incontestable
rights), and instead focused on hortatory official proclamations from the
Spanish period. It cited a 1781 decree establishing the pueblo near the
river to encourage irrigation,"0 7 and the later Plan of Pitic, which had set
out the Spanish crown's pattern for the founding of new towns with
sufficient water for their residents.10 8 These documents, according to Los
Angeles, showed that the pueblo had been located on the river "for the
prosperity the waters of the stream would give," and that "the town
owned it, as it did its other property."'0 9 Therefore the city should not
now "be deprived of its ancient privileges.""0  The landowners contested
this reading of the Plan of Pitic, quoting its specific provision requiring
common water sharing between town residents and outsiders.'
104. Id. at 70.
105. Id. at 109-10, 117.
106. Id. at 23, 25-26.
107. Appellant's Points and Authorities at 18, Baldwin (No. 6040).
108. Id. at 24-26. The Plan of Pitic was issued in 1789 by the military commander of New
Spain's Internal Provinces (the northern frontier) as the founding document for a new pueblo, and
became a model for water distribution in all subsequent settlements under Spanish rule. Meyer,
supra note 8, at 30-37. In fact, the Plan provided for water sharing among town residents and non-
residents. Plan of Pitic, art. 7 (1789), translated in John W. Dwinelle, The Colonial History of San
Francisco, addenda VII (1867).
109. Appellant's Points and Authorities at 26, Baldwin (No. 6040).
110. Id. at 52.
111. The Plan provided that "the residents and natives should equally enjoy the woods, pastures,
waters, privileges and other advantages of the royal and vacant lands that might be outside the land
assigned to the new settlements in common with the residents of the adjoining Pueblos."
Respondent's Points and Authorities at 20, Baldwin (No. 6,040) (quoting Plan of Pitic, art. 7 (1789)).
The landowners' construction of the Plan is consistent with that of the professional historians who
have analyzed it. Dobkins, supra note 9, at 101; Hundley, supra note 8, at 39-40; Meyer, supra note
8, at 35-36.
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The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding squarely that the city
was not the owner of the river's water. 2 The court also cited a prior
judgment between the same parties, by which the upstream landowners,
as riparians, had been permitted to divert the same amount."3 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Augustus Rhodes averred that it was
unnecessary to determine the validity of the city's title because this prior
ruling was dispositive on the permissible uses of the river."4
Thus, when first presented with Los Angeles's broad claim to a pueblo
water right, the supreme court clearly held that the city owned no such
interest. Los Angeles had attempted to extrapolate its absolute
ownership from vague Spanish decrees promoting sufficient water access
for residents of new towns, and had relied on romantic language about
"ancient privileges." The upstream landowners responded with Hispanic
customary and legal evidence demonstrating that upstream irrigation had
often been permitted, and that the official policy had been one of water
sharing. The view of Spanish and Mexican water rights as communal
and subject to balancing is consistent with scholarly characterizations of
the system that prevailed in the pre-Conquest Southwest." 5 In addition,
the landowners' argument for a fair water share was supported by the
"reasonable use" variant of riparian rights accepted by nineteenth-
century American courts."
6
One historian who has analyzed Baldwin, Norris Hundley, mistakes
Rhodes's concurrence for the court's holding, and so believes the court
did not reach the pueblo question."7 In fact, the majority expressly
found the evidence insufficient to support the city's assertion of title to
the river." 8  Later courts, presented with identical evidence, would
reverse direction, disregarding Hispanic law and validating Los
Angeles's claim.
112. City of Los Angeles v. Baldwin, 53 Cal. 469,469 (1879).
113. Id. at 469-70.
114. Id. at 473-74 (Rhodes, J., concurring).
115. See sources cited supra note 88.
116. Traditional common law riparian doctrine strictly prohibited landowners from interfering
with a river's natural flow, but by the mid-nineteenth century instrumentalist courts were allowing
any "reasonable use," facilitating new activities such as intensive irrigation and mill dams. Horwitz,
Transformation I, supra note 19, at 34-40. A reasonable use test was applied in California mining
law to prevent water monopolization and degradation by prior appropriators. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
117. Hundley, supra note 8, at 129-130. Hundley quotes from the concurrence, rather than the
majority, regarding the lack of necessity for inquiry into the "source, nature, or extent" of the city's
title. Compare Baldwin, 53 Cal. at 474 with Hundley, supra note 8, at 129-30.
118. Baldwin, 53 Cal. at 469.
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The California Supreme Court next considered the extent of the
pueblo water right two years later, in Feliz v. City of Los Angeles, 9 and
a companion case, Elms v. City of Los Angeles. 20 Both cases concerned
upstream landowners on the former Rancho Los Feliz who had not been
involved in Baldwin, but similarly found themselves at odds with the
city.' This time, Los Angeles officials entered the owners' land and
blocked off their diversion ditches in order to prevent diminution of the
river's flow." The city then offered to sell back the water at the same
price offered to other nonurban users."u When the landowners sued to
enjoin Los Angeles from obstructing their ditches, maintaining that they
had irrigated from the river without interference since the 1840s, 24 the
city asserted its exclusive pueblo claim."z The trial court held, as in
Baldwin, that all riparians were entitled to reasonable use of the river's
water, and restrained Los Angeles from denying the landowners a
reasonable amount. 2
6
In the California Supreme Court, the city expaaded the romantic
arguments it had employed in Baldwin. Referring back to medieval
Spain, it alleged, without citing any authority, that "[tjhe idea of property
under the Spanish laws is much more absolute than it is under the
common laws. A man owned his property absolutely."'27 During oral
argument, City Attorney John Godfrey extravagantly proclaimed that "so
long as there is any water in the river, provided we require it, we have
the first right to it," and that "the right of the city ... to supply the people
of this town has never been questioned."'28 The landowners countered
that there was no exclusive pueblo right, becaase Baldwin was
controlling'29 and Hispanic custom and law explicitly provided
119. Feliz v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 73 (1881).
120. Elms v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 80 (1881).
121. Hundley, supra note 8, at 130.
122. Felz, 58 Cal. at 75.
123. Transcript on Appeal at 72, Feliz (No. 7502).
124. Id. at 30-33.
125. Id. at 58.
126. Id. at 75-76.
127. Appellant's Brief at 18, Feliz (No. 7502) (quoting Appellants' 3rief at 34, Steinbach v.
Moore, 30 Cal. 498 (1866)). Los Angeles quoted the passage from the Stdnbach brief, which itself
cited nothing in support. Id.; see Appellants' Brief at 34, Steinbach. Several Spanish legal sources
also cited by the city on page 18 of its brief correspond to issues other than the "absolute property"
idea. See Appellant's Brief at 18, Feliz (No. 7502).
128. Arguments of Counsel for Appellants and Respondents at 8, 78, Feliz and Elms (Nos. 7502,
7501).
129, Id. at 56.
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otherwise. 3° They discussed the evidence of long customary irrigation
to which the city had never previously objected.'3 ' The owners also
pointed out that the Plan of Pitic did not recognize a pueblo's right to
irrigate all the land within its limits because not all tracts were deemed
irrigable.132 Los Angeles, they maintained, was now demanding water to
irrigate a large amount of land which had not been intended for such use
when the pueblo was founded.
133
The supreme court reversed the trial court, finding that for more than
one hundred years the city's claim to "all the waters of the Los Angeles
River" had been recognized "by all persons interested from the head of
the stream and along its banks.' ' 34  The landowners and their grantors
were among those acknowledging the city's exclusive right, according to
the court, since they had used the river only with the municipal
authorities' permission. 135 Thus Los Angeles could prevent the upstream
diversions at issue because of this long-standing recognition, and not, the
court added, based on Hispanic law.'36 The justices concluded that, "to
the extent of the needs of its inhabitants," the city had "the paramount
right to the use of the waters of the river,"137 but could not sell water to
outside users if such sales would injure riparians.138
The Feliz court thus reached a result contrary to that in Baldwin, but
skirted the pueblo question by basing the city's water rights on past
acknowledgment rather than Spanish or Mexican law. As it had done in
Baldwin, Los Angeles made vague, often unsupported assertions, while
the landowners cited specifically to Hispanic custom and law. This time,
however, the justices accepted the city's position, although not its
nostalgic arguments. The court may have been unwilling to overrule
Baldwin directly by validating the pueblo right in the face of the
130. Id. at 56-57; Respondents' Points and Authorities at 8, Feliz (No. 7502).
131. Respondents' Points and Authorities at 7, Elms (No. 7501).
132. Id. at 5-6. This view is consistent with that of modem legal historians. See Baade, supra
note 9, at 63-64; Meyer, supra note 8, at 124-131 (discussing different water rights appurtenant to
various land categories).
133. Arguments of Counsel for Appellants and Respondents at 34-35, Feliz and Elms (Nos. 7502,
7501).
134. Feliz, 58 Cal. at 78-79. The Feliz court's reasoning and result was adopted in Elms. Elms,
58 Cal. at 80.
135. Feliz, 58 Cal. at 79.
136. Id. The court stated that it had not examined the city's rights "as they existed under the
Spanish and Mexican laws, applicable to pueblos, for the findings in this case render such
examination unnecessary." Id.
137. Id. at 80.
138. Id. at 79-80.
Washington Law Review Vol. 69:869, 1994
diverters' historical evidence. In any event, Feliz represented a judicial
move towards facilitating Los Angeles's control over the river, at the
expense of the upstream farmers.
Following the Feliz decision, Southern California's rapid population
growth and periodic droughts continued to impel the city to enlarge its
water supply.'39 In 1886, the supreme court's Lux v, Haggin"4 ' opinion
finally used language recognizing an historical pueblo water right. Lux,
involving a conflict between riparian landowners and appropriators in the
San Joaquin Valley, stood for the proposition that common law riparian
rights were superior unless an appropriation antedated the riparian's
ownership.'4 ' Buttressing its holding with references to Hispanic law,
the Lux court stated in dicta that "the pueblos had a species of property in
the flowing waters within their limits," 42 which gave them "a preference
or prior right to consume the waters, even as against an upper riparian
proprietor."' 43
The court posited that the pueblo water right followed from its 1860
ruling in Hart v. Burnett that under Mexican law a pueblo "had a certain
right or title to the lands within its general limits," which were "held in
trust for the public use."'" That Hart held pueblos to have merely a trust
obligation rather than a vested land title, and referred only to land, not
139. Hundley, supra note 8, at 132.
140. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
141. Id. at 731, 744. Lux established California's dual system of water rights, by which timing
determined whether riparian or appropriative rights prevailed in a particular controversy. Hundley,
supra note 8, at 95. The system tended to favor large riparian landowners because by the 1880s,
most riverbank land in irrigable areas was already privately owned. Id. git 96. See also Freyfogle,
supra note 32; M. Catherine Miller, Flooding the Courtrooms 10-20 (1993); Pisani, supra note 63,
at 191-249 (analyzing the background and effects of the decision).
142. Lux, 10 P. at715.
143. Id. at 716-17. These passages were dicta because, as the court acknowledged, "no pueblo
existed on the water-course ... which is the subject of the current controversy." Id. at 717.
144. Id. at 714 (quoting Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 616 (1860)). On this basis, Hart had
confirmed land sales within the former Mexican settlement of San Francisco by its American
successor city, but invalidated execution sales made to satisfy municipal debts. Hart, 15 Cal. at 616.
Despite the belief of much of the San Francisco bar that all sales under "pueblo" authority were
invalid because the city's predecessor was never officially a pueblo, the court had responded to local
political pressure to stabilize land titles. See Christian G. Fritz, Federal Justice in California: The
Court of Odgen Hoffman, 1851-1891 180-209 (1991). See also Selvin, supra note 24, at 170-277
(discussing Hart and its influence on the development of the modem "public trust" doctrine). Unlike
Fritz, and consistent with her uncritical acceptance of Los Angeles's pueblo water right, Selvin does
not question Hart's assumptions that San Francisco was a Mexican pueblo, and that pueblos had the
power to alienate land. Compare Fritz, supra this note, at 188-89, with Selvin, supra note 24, at
170-277.
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appurtenant water rights, did not seem to bother the court.'45 In further
support of its dicta, the Lux opinion quoted early nineteenth-century
Spanish commentator Joaquin Escriche y Martin regarding non-
navigable streams: "[T]he owners of the lands through which they pass
may use the waters thereof for the utility of their farms or industry,
without prejudice to the common use or destiny which the pueblos on
their course shall have given them . ,,.4."'4 The court's reference does
not explain why a mere obligation of water users not to prejudice pueblos
justifies giving priority to the latter. Though both sides in the Baldwin
and Feliz litigation had mentioned these passages from Hart and
Escriche, Lux now marshaled them as evidence that Hispanic law
sanctioned the pueblo right.
Encouraged by the Lux decision, the Los Angeles City Council
planned further expansion of the municipal water system, maintaining in
an 1892 report that, according to Mexican law, any pueblo established on
a river made all subsequent riparian owners subject to the pueblo's
appropriation. 47 The following year, a trial court stated in dicta that the
pueblo's right was not limited to its original needs, but expanded with
any population increase, being "co-extensive with the wants of the
prospective town or city," and even included the Los Angeles River's
underground flow. 48 By the mid-1890s, the popular and judicial climate
was ripe for a clear statement of the pueblo water right under Hispanic
law.
The definitive ruling that the pueblo right existed came in the 1895
decision Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles.1 49  In Vernon, a
downstream riparian owner sued to enjoin the city from diverting more
145. Legal historian Hans Baade criticizes Lux for misstating Hart to stand for a vested municipal
property right rather than a trust obligation, and then assuming that the municipality also had a
vested right in water. Baade, supra note 9, at 86-87. Rather, Hispanic pueblos neither owned land
nor had the right to alienate it. Id. at 87 nA60.
146. Lux, 10 P. at 716 (quoting I Joaquin Escriche y Martin, Diccionarlo Razonado de
Legislacin yJurisprudencia 134 (1847)) (emphasis in original).
147. Our Water Supply, The Report in Favor of City Ownership, L.A. Express, Mar. 14, 1892.
The city was building additional headworks, pumping stations, and a reservoir. Id.
148. City of Los Angeles v. Crystal Springs Land & Water Co. (L.A. Super. Ct. 1893), quoted in
Some Interesting Water Law, L.A. Herald, Dec. 7, 1893. In Crystal Springs, a city suit to enjoin the
use of piped municipal water was dismissed because the defendants never used nor intended to use
the water. Id. The quoted passage was dicta because Los Angeles's right to the water was not at
issue. The judge in the case was Walter Van Dyke, who was involved in Spanish revival activities
through Charles Lummis's Southwest Society and later served on the California Supreme Court from
1899 to 1905. See Letter from Lummis to Van Dyke, supra note 79; Robinson, supra note 79, at
342.
149. 39 P. 762 (Cal. 1895).
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water than necessary for municipal purposes and from selling the surplus
to users outside the city limits. 5 ' Trial judge Lucien Shaw... broadly held
that Los Angeles was "the exclusive owner of all the water flowing in the
river... together with the right to control, divert, use, sell and dispose of
the whole thereof for any and every purpose either inside or outside of
said city."'52 According to Shaw, this right had belonged to Los Angeles
"from time immemorial," and at least since the Spanish pueblo was
founded.'53
On appeal, Vernon presented the same documentary and testimonial
evidence that had been before the Supreme Court in Baldwin,
maintaining that the former determination of the city's non-ownership
should be binding.'54 The appellant specifically referred to eyewitness
testimony that in the Mexican period, the pueblo never used all of the
river's water.' Vernon also argued that regardless of the Hispanic legal
evidence, Los Angeles had failed to assert its water claim before the
Board of Land Commissioners, established by Congress in 1851 to
adjudicate Spanish and Mexican property rights protected by the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 56 The Board had confirmed the city's title to
only four square leagues of land, so its alleged pueblo right to the entire
river could not now be raised. 57
Los Angeles replied that Baldwin was merely dicta as to river
ownership,'58 and reiterated many of the arguments it had made in that
case and Feliz. The city claimed again to be the "absolute owner of all
the waters of the river," and to have at least a vested right to use, control,
and distribute the water.'59 As before, it justified these assertions with
phrases about the pueblo's "ancient origin,"'60 and with the sourceless
150. Id. at 762-63.
151. Shaw later served on the California Supreme Court from 1903 .o 1923, retiring as Chief
Justice. Robinson, supra note 79, at 341.
152. Transcript on Appeal at 66, Vernon (No. 19,388).
153. Id. at53.
154. Appellant's Brief at 26-27, Vernon (No. 19,388). Vernon also introduced the transcript from
Feliz and Elms. Id. at 27-28.
155. Id. at 34-35.
156. Appellant's Closing Brief at 35-37, Vernon (No. 19,388). See Cheever, supra note 91, at
1382-83 (discussing establishment and jurisdiction of Board).
157. Appellant's Brief at 21, Vernon (No. 19,388). See W.W. Robinson, Land In California
238-39, 242-43 (discussing the 1856 confirmation and 1866 patenting of Los Angeles's title).
158. Respondent's Brief at 75-76, Vernon (No. 19,388).
159. Id. at5.
160. Id. at 8.
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contention about absolute property in medieval Spain. 61 Los Angeles
could now also quote Lux's statement that "pueblos had a species of
property in the flowing waters within their limits,"1 62 commenting that
although the passage was dicta, "the inference is that the city has such
property."' 63 The city never addressed its failure to obtain confirmation
of its water claim.
Ignoring Baldwin and citing Lux, the California Supreme Court held
that
pueblos had a right to the water which had been appropriated to the
use of the inhabitants, similar to that which it had in the pueblo
lands, and that the right of its successor, the city, to the water for its
inhabitants and for municipal purposes is superior to the rights of
plaintiff as a riparian owner.'"
The sole limitation on Los Angeles's right was that it "could be
asserted only to the amount needed to supply the wants of the
inhabitants," thus barring sales of the surplus to outside parties. 65 Yet
the court also pointed the way to future expansion of the pueblo right,
suggesting that "the wants of a city naturally fluctuate, and on an
emergency may be greatly increased beyond ordinary wants."'
66
For the first time, the state's highest court had held that Los Angeles
had an absolute and exclusive pueblo water right, ostensibly based on
Hispanic law. In the fourteen years since the Feliz decision, this result
had been encouraged by the city's increasing need for water, the
sentiments of municipal officials and trial judges, and the court's own
dicta in Lux. The invention of a right allegedly sanctioned by history
was an effective vehicle to elevate Los Angeles's interests above those of
all other river users, upstream and down.
Historian Norris Hundley argues that the justices had little choice in
their ruling because Vernon's attorneys introduced "almost no
documentary evidence challenging the city's interpretation of the pueblo
claim," and focused instead on the Land Commission issue. 67 But this
analysis of judicial benignity overlooks the fact that the court was indeed
161. Id. at 15.
162. Id. at 62 (quoting Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674,715 (Cal. 1886)).
163. Id. at 62.
164. Vernon, 39 P. at 766.
165. Id. at 767.
166. Id. at 768.
167. Hundley, supra note 8, at 134.
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presented with all the voluminous data on Hispanic custom and law from
the Baldwin and Feliz records, including testimonial proof that the
pueblo never monopolized all the river's water.1 6' The justices chose to
disregard this evidence and create an absolute right to the water, limited
only by municipal needs. The reality of a completely result-oriented
court is lent further credence by its failure to mention Los Angeles's lack
of a confirmed water title.
Vernon's one qualification to the pueblo water right, the ban on
outside sales, was rapidly rendered moot by events following the
decision. While the city's revenue from such sales was slight, 169 they
were crucial to the outlying communities, which lacked independent
water resources. 70 In the five years following Vernon, several adjacent
suburbs, including Highland Park, voted to annex themselves to Los
Angeles, adding 14.05 square miles to the city's area. for a total of 43.26
by 1900.171
The supreme court clarified and extended the pueblo doctrine in the
1899 Los Angeles v. Pomeroy decision.1 72 Pomeroy concerned the city's
suit to condemn the property of two upstream riparian landowners in
order to construct waterworks." The trial court permitted the
condemnation, awarding compensation to the owners for their property
but not for their claimed interest in underground water. 74 On appeal, the
issues included whether the pueblo right entitled Los Angeles to supply
newly annexed areas outside the original pueblo bounds, to maintain
artificial lakes and fountains, and to claim ownership of the river's
subsurface flow.
The landowners argued that even if the city had a pueblo water right,
this did not authorize uses beyond the Spanish town limits or the
maintenance of artificial lakes.17 Further, they pointed out that Los
Angeles had not requested confirmation of any groundwater rights before
the Board of Land Commissioners. 76 The city, without any specific
168. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
169. The Vernon Water Case, L.A. Times, Mar. 11, 1895, at 10.
170. Ostrom, supra note 95, at 146.
171. Id.
172. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585 (Cal. 1899).
173. Id. at 586. The works comprised an underground tunnel with lateral galleries to drain and
filter water from saturated soil, a submerged dam, and storage reservoirs. Id. at 587.
174. Id. at 586, 591.
175. Appellants' Opening Brief at 27, Pomeroy (No. 419).
176. Id. at 124.
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references to Hispanic custom or law, asserted that the pueblo doctrine
extended to the annexed tracts and conferred title to the river's
subterranean flow. 177 In support of the first proposition, Los Angeles
was content to quote 1893 trial court dicta that the pueblo's founders
"evidently contemplated that it would grow and foster and consequently
increase in population and that the demand for the use of the water would
correspondingly increase." 78 It also cited the same court's further dicta
that subsurface flow was part of the river.179 In closing its brief, Los
Angeles employed the same romantic rhetoric about exclusive water
rights it had used in previous cases, relating how the city was
attempting to carry out the policy of the Spanish government which
was instituted on the establishment of the old pueblo, of controlling
its own water supply, and thus utilizing the waters of the river, that
priceless inheritance which she still retains intact and for which she
is indebted to that beneficent policy. 8
A five-justice majority held that the pueblo right expanded with the
needs of Los Angeles's population, and thus should be extended to the
supplying of the annexed areas.' Without providing any further
authority on Hispanic custom or law than had the city's brief, the judges
speculated that
[u]nquestionably it was contemplated and hoped that at least some
of [the pueblos] would so prosper and outgrow the simple form of
the rural village. It is in the nature of things that this might happen,
and when it did, and the communal lands were required for house
lots, we must presume that under Mexican and Spanish rule they
could be so converted, and that, when the population increased so
as to overflow the limits of the pueblo, such extension could be
legally accomplished. Had this happened under Mexican rule, can
it be doubted that the right vested in the pueblo would have been
construed to be for the benefit of the population, however great the
increase would be?
82
177. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 587.
178. Respondent's Brief at 92, Pomeroy (No. 419) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Crystal
Springs Land & Water Co. (L.A. Super. Ct. 1893)). See discussion supra note 146.
179. Respondent's Brief at 92, Pomeroy (No. 419).
180. Id. at 148.
181. Pomeroy, 57 P. at 586.
182. Id. at 604.
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Therefore, if Los Angeles's needs increased with its population, the
water right would expand with them, even beyond the original pueblo
limits.83
The same majority also ruled that the city's use of water for artificial
lakes, though possibly an "extravagance or waste." was nevertheless
"clearly a municipal use which is familiar in municipal history."'8 4 The
justices unanimously held that the pueblo right alse applied to the Los
Angeles River's subterranean flow, on a reliance theory that "[t]o hold
otherwise would be destructive of rights long supposed to be certain and
assured," i.e. "the faith that [the city] was secure of a supply of water for
domestic and municipal purposes."'85 The court suggested that if any
landowner could draw off the underground flow, no landowner would be
secure, for "the man or corporation that can put in the largest tunnel at
the lowest level will get the lion's share."' 86
In an eighteen-page concurrence, Chief Justice Beatty took a more
limited, historical view of the legitimacy of certain water uses. He
disputed the majority's stand on annexed areas, arguing that the pueblo
right should not extend beyond the original pueblo's four-league
territory."' Further, Beatty considered that artificial lakes were not
consistent with Hispanic municipal policy, because such use was never
"necessary for the support or health or convenience of the inhabitants of
a pueblo, however much it may have contributed to their pleasure," and
would have consumed water more needed for domestic uses, irrigation,
and stock watering.'
Having created the pueblo water right out of whole cloth in Vernon,
the California Supreme Court demonstrated in Pomeroy that it was
willing to expand the right infinitely by speculating as to what Hispanic
custom or law would have comprehended. The extension to annexed
areas was based solely on the majority's assumption that the original
right would have grown with the population. This ruling effectively
rendered meaningless Vernon's ban on outside sales.
Again indulging a presupposition about the original scope of the right
and the pueblo's reliance, the justices unanimously gave the city
exclusive control of the river's subsurface flow. This was inconsistent
183. Id. at 586.
184. Id. at 605.
185. Id. at 599.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 600 (Beatty, C.., concurrring).
188. Id. at 601 (Beatty, C.J., concurrring).
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with Hispanic law as set forth by Escriche, who stated that groundwater
was considered the private property of the surface owner, and that a
pueblo had to compensate such owners for any use of subterranean water
appurtenant to their land.'89 Escriche's discussion of underground water
would have been familiar to the court because portions of it had already
been cited by parties in the prior pueblo cases, 9 ' and it was translated in
Frederic Hall's 1885 treatise, The Laws of Mexico. 9' As far as the
artificial lakes were concerned, the majority did not even attempt an
Hispanic legal justification, but merely asserted that this was a use
"familiar in municipal history."'92 Justice Beatty's disagreement on this
point was based on the historical reality, which must have been known to
the justices, that prior to the American period purely ornamental water
use was precluded by agricultural necessities."'
In linking the pueblo water right to the needs of an expanding
population, did the Pomeroy majority distort history out of ignorance or
by design? Given the justices' exposure as recently as four years before
to voluminous documents showing the lack of any such absolute right
and establishing that groundwater belonged to the surface owner, the
likelihood is that they knew what they were doing. Furthermore, Justice
Beatty's concurrence suggests that a more realistic historical assessment
was possible. In any event, the decision's logical outcome was to
facilitate almost infinite urban growth. As Beatty himself later observed,
Los Angeles could now
annex all the lands between it and the ocean... and the inhabitants
of this annexed territory immediately become vested with the
paramount right to the water flowing in the tributaries of the river,
whether above or below the ground, notwithstanding they have
189. 1 Joaquin Escriche y Martin, Diccionario Razonado de Legislaci6n y Jurisprudencia 134
(1847). See Michael C. Meyer, The Living Legacy of Hispanic Groundwater Law in the
Contemporary Southwest, 31 J. Sw. 287, 297 (1989) (analyzing this passage).
190. See Respondent's Points and Authorities at 23, City of Los Angeles v. Baldwin, 53 Cal. 469
(1879) (No. 6040); Appellant's Brief at 41-42, Feliz v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 73 (1881) (No.
7502); Respondent's Brief at 39-40, Vernon Irrigation Co. v. Los Angeles, 39 P. 762 (Cal. 1895)
(No. 19,388).
191. Frederic Hall, The Laws of Mexico: A Compilation and Treatise § 1387 (1885). As a matter
of evidence law, the court could have taken judicial notice of the former laws of another sovereignty
which had become a part of the law of the forum. 4 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System
of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2573(d) (1905).
192. City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 605 (Cal. 1899).
193. Hundley, supra note 8, at 43, discusses the uses to which pueblos put water, including
watering animals, irrigation and household needs, with artificial lakes not being among these.
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been used for a hundred years by the grantees of Spain and
Mexico. 19
4
Indeed, from 1900 to 1930 the city expanded its area from forty-three
to 442 square miles, almost entirely through the annexation of adjacent
communities.' 9
Having knowingly based absolute municipal water control on an
historical myth, it was not difficult for the court to dispose of contrary
arguments and further expand the reach of the doctrine. In the 1908 case
of City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co.,'96 the
court finally addressed the question, raised and unresolved in Vernon and
Pomeroy, of whether the city had waived its pueblo right by failing to
obtain Land Commission confirmation. 97 The justices rejected this
argument, holding that since Los Angeles's land rights had been
confirmed, any appurtenant water rights should be determined by state
law. 9 And in 1909, the court ruled in City of Los Angeles v. Hunter 99
that the pueblo water right extended to the San Fernando Valley's entire
underground basin, which it described as "the great natural reservoir and
supply of the Los Angeles River.'2"' By the time of Hunter, the court no
longer felt the necessity to justify the pueblo doctrine with any Hispanic
law references, and was willing to extend it simply by expanding the
river's hydrological definition.
The 1913 opening of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, bringing water from
central California's Owens Valley, ended the city's sole reliance on the
river for its development.2"' This new era was symbolized in Hunter by
194. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co., 93 1'. 1135 (Cal. 1908) (mem.)
(Beatty, C.J. dissenting).
195. Fogelson, supra note 94, at 226-27.
196. 93 P. 869 (Cal. 1908), appeal dismissed, 217 U.S. 217 (1910).
197. Id. at 871.
198. Id.
199. 105 P. 755 (Cal. 1909).
200. Id. at 757. The connection between the subterranean basin and the river was established
because "the cutting off of this supply would as completely destroy the Los Angeles River as would
the cutting off of the Great Lakes destroy the St. Lawrence. San Fernando Valley may indeed be
regarded as a great lake filled with loose detritus, into which the drainage from the neighboring
mountains flows, and the outlet of which is the Los Angeles River." Id.
201. See Abraham Hoffman, Vision or Villainy 47-143 (1981); Hundley, supra note 8, at 139-68
(discussing Los Angeles's facilitation of the Owens Valley reservoir and aqueduct project through
land purchases and bond issues). See also Hoffman, supra this note, at 125-28; Hundley, supra note
8, at 158-61 (evaluating the evidence that real estate investors took acvantage of privileged city
information to purchase San Fernando Valley land prior to the proj.ect's completion, a thesis
advanced in the 1974 movie Chinatown).
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the involvement of Los Angeles Water Superintendent William
Mulholland, chief promoter of the aqueduct, who testified for the city on
the extent of the San Fernando Valley watershed.22 By this time the
pueblo water right had served its purpose of assuring a local supply for
Los Angeles upon which more imperial plans could be built. The city's
brief in Hunter had acknowledged this relationship between doctrine and
policy when it argued that the "ancient prior right in the waters of the
river, more than anything else, is indispensable to [Los Angeles's]
growth and prosperity."2 3 The true nature of Hispanic municipal water
rights having been suppressed, the pueblo right had also entered common
law water jurisprudence, being explicated in Clesson Kinney's
authoritative 1912 work, A Treatise on the Law of Irrigation and Water
Rights.2"4 As an established doctrine, it was available for courts to apply
when other California cities needed water.
Like Los Angeles, San Diego was expanding rapidly during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 5 The primary water source in
the area was the San Diego River, which became a subject of contention
between San Diego and other municipalities such as El Cajon, La Mesa,
and Lemon Grove.206 In 1914, San Diego's City Attorney, T.B.
Cosgrove, responded to a City Council request to investigate and report
on the City's rights to the river.20 7 Using language clearly borrowed
from the Los Angeles pueblo decisions, he concluded that the "prior and
paramount right to the use of the waters of the San Diego River is held
by the City in trust for the use of the general public for all municipal
purposes, and this right is to the waters of the entire river, from bed rock
to surface, and from the tiny rivulet that trickles down from the rim of
the great watershed, to the shimmering sands where the bed of the San
Diego meets the sea."208
Despite Cosgrove's report, the city's Board of Water Commissioners
rejected the paramount right theory in 1922 after an exhaustive
202. Hunter, 105 P. at 758.
203. Brief for Respondent at 134, Hunter (No. 2140).
204. 3 Clesson S. Kinney, A Treatise on the Law of Irrigation and Water Rights 2590-93 (2d ed.
1912). Kinney described the right as "one of the strongest titles that a municipality may have." Id.
at 2593.
205. San Diego's population grew from 17,000 in 1900 to 74,683 in 1920. Hopkins, supra note
78, at 348.
206. Id. at 293, 298; see infra note 212 and accompanying text.
207. T.B. Cosgrove, An Opinion on the Rights of the City of San Diego to the Waters of the San
Diego River I (1914).
208. Id. at 22-23.
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investigation.2"9 In response, Mayor John L. Bacon, a supporter of the
prior right, dismissed the entire Commission,"'0 and shortly thereafter
San Diego filed a quiet title suit against the Cuyamaca Water Company,
an upstream riparian diverter and supplier cf several smaller
municipalities."' The city of El Cajon and the La Mesa, Lemon Grove
& Spring Valley Irrigation District filed complaints in intervention, also
alleging rights to the river."' The trial court held that as the successor to
a Mexican pueblo, San Diego had a "right of priority" to all the river's
water,"1 3 but conceded that, by allowing previous diversions, the city had
created certain rights in defendant and interveners based on prescription,
laches, and estoppel."a 4
On appeal, Cuyamaca and the intervenors made both historical and
policy arguments against the recognition of any absolute pueblo water
right. First, they contended that Spanish and Mexicza pueblos and their
successor cities had no such rights under Hispanic law.2"5 Specifically
concerning San Diego, the appellants alleged that the San Diego mission,
whose 1769 founding long predated the 1834 establishment of the
pueblo, had received a prior and exclusive royal grant to the river." 6 In
support, they cited a 1773 document in which the Viceroy of New Spain
granted the local waters to the mission to administer for the benefit of the
local Native Americans.217 Apart from disputing the validity of the
pueblo title, the appellants claimed rights based cn prescription and
laches because the pueblo and city had never previously objected to their
use of the river, and on estoppel because the city had affirmatively
permitted other parties' diversions. 8 Finally, appellants made the policy
argument that recognizing an exclusive water right in San Diego would
209. Hopkins, supra note 78, at 306.
210. Id.
211. City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 287 P. 475, 478-479 (Cal. 1930). See also
Shelley J. Higgins, This Fantastic City San Diego 1-119 (1956) (eyewitness account of San Diego
pueblo litigation from perspective of City Attorney).
212. Cuyamaca, 287 P. at 479.
213. Id. at481.
214. Id. at 486-95.
215. Id. at 483-84.
216. Id. at 484.
217. Id. According to the grant, the mission was given the water "for the common benefit of all
the nation, whether Gentile or converted, who dwell today or in the future in the province of the
Mission of San Diego de Acala. This concession and the fruits also shall be held (ser tener) as to
these children and their children and successors forever." Id. (quoting grant from Viceroy of New
Spain to Mission of San Diego, Dec. 17, 1773).
218. Id. at486,491.
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have "disturbing and even disastrous consequences," chiefly financial,
for the upstream communities.219
Yet in the 1930 decision of City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water
Co., ° the California Supreme Court upheld San Diego's right,
notwithstanding the contrary historical evidence and arguments. In
broad language reminiscent of the Los Angeles pueblo decisions, the
court decreed that the city was "the owner in fee simple of the prior and
paramount right to the use of all the water (surface and underground) of
the San Diego river, including its tributaries, from its source to its mouth,
for the use of the said city of San Diego and of its inhabitants, for all
purposes."22' The justices stated that the general question of pueblos'
water rights had been resolved by the Los Angeles cases, and under stare
decisis had become "a rule of property." They disparaged the 1773
grant, considering it unlikely that the Viceroy intended to confer
exclusive rights upon a "primitive and as yet largely experimental
mission settlement.' 'tm
The court even rejected the rights based on prescription and laches
conceded below, holding that the city's needs were always uncertain, and
it could not have been expected to object previously to appellants'
diversions because they were not yet interfering with its own usage.224
Nor did estoppel apply, for none of the city's affirmative arrangements
with diverters had been with appellants or their predecessors.' Finally,
the justices brushed aside public policy considerations, holding that any
adverse economic effect on the upstream communities was no reason to
deprive the city of its "ancient, prior, and paramount right.
'' 26
Thus, as it had done for Los Angeles, the California Supreme Court
established an absolute and exclusive pueblo water right for San Diego.
As before, the court made its decision in the face of solid adverse
historical evidence and despite strong policy concerns. Like Los
Angeles, San Diego now had a monopoly over its local water source,
facilitating urban expansion. Indeed, following Cuyamaca, San Diego
219. Id. at 495.
220. Id. at 475.
221. Id. at 496.
222. Id. at 484.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 489. This ruling was consistent with the court's statement in Vernon that the water
needs of a city fluctuate, thus making the pueblo water right impossible to quantify. Vernon
Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 39 P. 762, 768 (Cal. 1895).
225. Cuyamaca, 287 P. at 491.
226. Id. at 495.
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used its newly established right to obtain ownership of three upstream
damsites from the La Mesa Irrigation District, one of' the intervenors, by
allowing it some water access in exchange. 7
While Cuyamaca was being litigated, Los Angeles also continued to
grow, its rivals for water now smaller cities rather then the landowners it
had confronted in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 28
Following the 1913 completion of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, the city no
longer used all the groundwater in the San Fernando Valley, and other
municipalities began to pump it for their needs.229 Between 1914 and
1936, the cities of Glendale and Burbank spent $5.6 and $2.1 million,
respectively, on land, wells, and distribution.230 In 1936, Los Angeles
sued to have its rights to Valley water declared prior to those of all other
users.231  At issue were four water sources: water normally present,
floodwater reclaimed from Los Angeles River tributaries, stored Owens
Valley water, and Owens water returned after use from agricultural
purchasers. 2  The trial court held that the city's pueblo title applied to
the normal groundwater, though not the reclaimed f.oodwater, and that
the city also had a prior right to recapture the imported water.23
On appeal, Glendale and Burbank attacked the pueblo doctrine as "an
attempt to clothe a right with immortality. 234  The appellant
municipalities also claimed prescription, laches, and estoppel. 5 Despite
appellants' arguments and their expenditures on water development,
Chief Justice Roger Traynor and a unanimous court upheld the pueblo
water right and extended it to the floodwater in the 1943 ruling of City of
Los Angeles v. City of Glendale.2 6 Since the reclaimed water was the
product of overflow from the Los Angeles River, it was subject to the
pueblo right under the previous cases, for "there is no reason to suppose
that this right did not include the right to take from the river.., when the
flow of the river was at its peak as well as at any other time." 7 Nor
227. William H. Jennings, Water Lawyer 14-15 (1967).
228. Between 1900 and 1930, the city's population increased from 102,000 to 2.3 million, and its
area from 43 to 442 square miles. Fogelson, supra note 94, at 78, 226-27.




233. Appellants' Opening Brief at 23-25, Glendale (Nos. 18,154, 18,155).
234. Id. at36.
235. Id.
236. Glendale, 142 P.2d at 293.
237. Id. at 293.
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could Glendale and Burbank acquire access via prescription, laches, or
estoppel, for under Cuyamaca, Los Angeles was not required to object to
other uses. 8 As to the stored and returned Owens Valley water, the
city's ownership was not lost simply because it was saved economically
for future use or utilized for irrigation before coming back.239
In again upholding and extending the pueblo water right, the Supreme
Court confirmed the appellants' gibe about immortality. Just as
romanticized ideas about Hispanic municipal water control had seeped
into jurisprudence, so in turn the long line of decisions reinforced it in
the popular mind. Carey McWilliams's widely read survey, Southern
California Country, originally published in 1946 and reprinted in 1973
as Southern California: An Island on the Land, accepted Los Angeles's
right as historical truth, asserting that "[n]ever did an American City owe
more to the fortuitous circumstance of Spanish settlement." '40 Practicing
lawyers also assimilated this view, one referring in a 1965 oral history
interview to "the old pueblo rights.., from the king of Spain." '241 Given
the persistence of its legal and popular image, it is not surprising that the
pueblo water right was reaffirmed in 1975, despite a well-documented
challenge and an adverse trial court ruling.
Because Glendale had only granted declaratory relief, the San
Fernando Valley cities were allowed to continue some underground
pumping. 42 After severe droughts in 1953 and 1955,243 Los Angeles
went to court again, seeking a declaration of its prior rights to the entire
Los Angeles River watershed and an injunction barring extraction by
Burbank, Glendale, San Fernando, a water district and several private
parties, except in subordination to the city's prior rights.2' The ensuing
litigation lasted twenty years and involved extensive testimony by
historical experts on both sides. 245 Framing the issue in romantic terms,
238. Id. at 295-96.
239. Id. at 294-95.
240. Carey McWilliams, Southern California: An Island on the Land 186 (1973). Ironically,
McWilliams was also a leading critic of the cultural myth of California's "Spanish" past. Id. at
70-83; Mcwilliams, supra note 35, at 35-47.
241. Jennings, supra note 227, at 142. According to Jennings, a water lawyer with thirty-five
years' experience, the pueblo right "just basically provided that a little town got a charter from the
king of Spain as a pueblo and acquired with that charter the use of the water from any streams that
they were located on to the extent of whatever needs they had." Id.
242. Walter Secor, Court to Test 1781 Gift of Water Rights, L.A. Times, Feb. 27, 1966, at KI.
243. The 1953 rainfall was 4.08 inches, the lowest since recording began in 1878. Los Angeles
Rainfall, 1878-1993, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1994, at B2.
244. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1258-59 (Cal. 1975).
245. Secor, supra note 242, at K1.
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the Los Angeles Times reported that "[a] decree given 185 years ago by
the King of Spain could in the near future force approximately 250,000
Valley area residents to pay more for water."246
After a 181-day nonjury trial, the trial court rejected Los Angeles'
pueblo right to native groundwater and its prior right to reclaim imported
Owens water sold to customers.247 The judge decided to reexamine
Hispanic law because of uncertainties in the prior cases, changed
circumstances since they were decided, the inclusion of new parties not
previously involved, and Los Angeles's allegation That its rights were
based on Spanish and Mexican precedent.248 After defendants' experts
testified that "the pueblo water right was truly a myth,"249 the trial court
found that under Hispanic law, river waters were to be shared generally,
with apportionment by the sovereign in times of shortage, and the pueblo
could not take water beyond its boundaries in the absence of an express
grant." Even the city's own expert admitted that water sharing was
instituted in the event of drought.2 1' As to the imported, returned water,
the court held that Los Angeles had no prior right to t because once this
was commingled with waters imported by other parties, the city had
neither the capacity nor the intent to recapture it. 2
In the 1975 decision of City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando,23
the California Supreme Court unanimously reversed, upholding the
pueblo right to the native water and the prior right to the imported water.
The court framed the issue to be whether the historical data relied upon
by the trial court was sufficient to overcome stare decisis as established
by the prior pueblo cases, rather than the existence of the pueblo title as
an original question.254 The justices held that the data presented, "while
not conclusively demonstrating the existence of the pueblo right, does
246. Id.
247. San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1265.
248. Id. at 1266.
249. Defendants' Consolidated Trial Brief at XII-4, City of Los Angelcs v. City of San Fernando
(Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Mar. 15, 1968) (No. 650,079).
250. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P. 2d 1250, 1266 (Cal. 1975).
251. Memorandum of Decision at 100-01, City of Los Angeles v. C ty of San Fernando (Cal.
Super. Ct., L.A. County, Mar. 15, 1968) (No. 650,079). The witness, William B. Stem, testified that
people shared water "as arranged by the authorities trying to do justice to everybody to the extent
possible." Id. at 100.
252. San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1267.
253. Id. at 1250.
254. Id. at 1284. The court explained that it was willing to reconsider its prior rulings due to the
quantity of historical evidence, the trial judge's detailed findings, and the potential effects on major
public entities. Id.
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not conclusively demonstrate its non-existence but on the contrary
provides a reasonable basis for a judicial determination that the right did
and still does exist."2"5 They found no serious discrepancies between the
material presented in the previous cases and that now before them, nor
any likelihood that past tribunals' consideration of the current data would
have changed the results. 6 Regardless of the evidence, Los Angeles
relied on the prior rulings when it brought in Owens water as a surplus,
while the defendant cities had been on notice of the pueblo doctrine since
they began extracting water at the turn of the century.257 The court
conceded one limitation on the pueblo right: that it did not apply to
underground basins hydrologically independent of the Los Angeles
River.28 Finally, the justices ruled that the city retained its prior right in
the imported water because it intended recapture, as had been found
previously in Glendale."59
The San Fernando decision ignored the clear historical evidence of
water apportionment that had convinced the trial court, resting instead on
stare decisis and reliance. Its immediate effect was to force the Valley
cities to replace the local water supply with water imported from
Northern California's Feather River, at three times the cost.60 After
nearly twenty years of litigation, the state's highest court had again
knowingly disregarded Hispanic custom and law in favor of Los
Angeles's water monopoly.
California's pueblo water rights doctrine was fully developed after the
Glendale case; San Fernando did not add to its essentials. To summarize
the characteristics of the doctrine, an American successor municipality to
a Spanish or Mexican pueblo has an absolute and exclusive right to all
the surface and groundwater of a stream flowing through the original
pueblo, including its peak floodflow and all its tributaries, from its
source to its mouth.26' The right of the successor city is superior to all
other riparian and appropriative rights, and cannot be lost through
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1284-85.
257. Id. at 1285.
258. Id. at 1288. There were three underground basins at issue in the case: the San Fernando,
Sylmar, and Verdugo subareas. The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the latter
two subareas were not tributary to the river's subsurface flow. Id. at 1285.
259. Id. at 1297.
260. Daryl Lembke, L.A. Wins 20-Year Fight on Disputed Water Rights, L.A. Times, May 13,
1975, at 1.
261. This summary is based on my discussion of the cases, supra part I.A., with reference to the
detailed description in Hutchins, supra note 12, at 751-52.
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prescription, laches, or estoppel. The only limitation is that the water
must be used for the needs of the city and its inhabitants, but these may
expand with population growth and the annexation of new areas.
These broad elements were developed by successive courts in the face
of contrary historical evidence and despite the deprivation of neighboring
landowners and municipalities. Previous historians have considered the
courts' distortion unintentional, attributing it to the failure of the pueblo
doctrine's opponents to document their challenges, or simply to lack of
historical knowledge on the part of judges.262 The court files examined
here show otherwise, leading to the conclusion that judges deliberately
idealized Hispanic law to justify urban water monopolization. Its lack of
historical basis obscured by repeated judicial invocations of tradition, the
pueblo right was an established rule by the time of Glendale, and had to
be confronted in other southwestern states where successor cities sought
control over water.
B. New Mexico
New Mexico and Texas provide contrasting examples of judicial
treatment of the pueblo water right outside California. Like California,
these states have several successor municipalities to Hispanic
communities within their boundaries.26 Also as in California, there is
ample historical evidence that Hispanic water custom and law were
characterized by communal water sharing, rather than any exclusive
pueblo right.2" But whereas New Mexico courts have until very recently
followed California and accepted the pueblo water right in the face of the
documentary record, Texas has rejected the doctrine.
Initially, New Mexico judges took a narrow view of the pueblo right's
application. In the 1914 case of State v. Tularosa Community Ditch,26
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a town founded after
annexation by the United States could not benefit from an exclusive right
262. See Hundley, supra note 8, at 134 (asserting that plaintiff in Vernon did not present Spanish
or Mexican legal evidence); and Baade, supra note 9, at 87 (claiming that California judges
developing the doctrine lacked Hispanic learning).
263. Such cities include Santa Fe, N.M. (founded 1610); El Paso, Tex. (1680); Albuquerque,
N.M. (1706); Las Vegas, N.M. (1835); San Antonio, Tex. (1731); and Laredo, Tex. (1767). See
Cruz, supra note 80, at 19-104 (discussing these pueblos in the context of Iberian municipal
traditions).
264. See Tyler, supra note 8, at 13, 44 (discussing water apportionment in New Mexico);
Dobkins, supra note 9, at 121-22; Glick, San Antonio, supra note 10, at 26-49 (same in Texas).
265. State v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 143 P. 207 (N.M. 1914).
906
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arising under Hispanic law.266 The supreme court set out a further
limitation in 1938, ruling in New Mexico Products Co. v. New Mexico
Power Co.2 67 that Santa Fe, a city established by the Spanish in 1610, had
no pueblo right because it was not founded originally under a royal grant
but rather as an informal "colony of deserters. 268  Even given these
restrictions, it was only a matter of time before a successor to an
Hispanic municipality founded under a grant sought control of its local
water supply.
Las Vegas, New Mexico originated in 1835 as a land grant from the
Mexican government to a group of settlers wishing to colonize the area
northeast of Santa Fe.269 The community and its American successor
municipalities, the town and city of Las Vegas, depended entirely for
their water on the meager Gallinas River.270 In the words of an early
twentieth-century resident, the Gallinas "was called the 'Chicken'
because a fowl could cross the stream without getting its feet wet."27' In
1955, when other users of the Gallinas sued Las Vegas's supplier, the
Public Service Company of New Mexico, for diverting the stream, the
town filed an answer as intervenor.272 The plaintiffs included the State
Insane Asylum and numerous small landowners, who claimed that their
crops were dying because Las Vegas was taking water for lawns and
carwashes.273 Some of the farmers claimed prior rights as inheritors of an
1821 Mexican land grant to Luis Cabeza de Baca.274 After trial, the
judge dismissed the complaint, holding that, as a successor to a Mexican
pueblo, Las Vegas had a right to divert and use as much of the river as
necessary for its inhabitants.
266. Id. at 215-16. This was true even though the community was founded by Hispanics, who
established a traditional common irrigation system. Id. at 209. See also C.L. Sonnichsen, Tularosa:
Last of the Frontier West 9-16 (1960) (describing the town's early settlement).
267. New Mexico Products Co. v. New Mexico Power Co., 77 P. 634 (N.M. 1937).
268. Id. at 639. The court contrasted its approach with that of California in Los Angeles Farming
& Milling Co., where a grant was presumed merely by virtue of a town's having existed before the
American period. Id. at 637-38.
269. Ebright, supra note 86, at 179-8 1. According to Ebright's research, the grant was comprised
of a series of small settlements rather than one compact pueblo. Id. at 182-83.
270. Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 343 P. 2d 654, 656 (N.M. 1958).
271. Milton C. Nahm, Las Vegas and Uncle Joe: The New Mexico IRemember 45 (1964).
272. Cartwright, 343 P.2d at 655.
273. Transcript of Record at 1-2, 11-12, Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico (N.M.
Dist. Ct., San Miguel County, 1956) (No. 15,329).
274. Cartwright, 343 P.2d at 663.
275. Id. at 655, 658.
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On appeal, the other water users made a number of legal, historical,
and policy arguments against the applicability of the pueblo water right,
most notably the following: First, they claimed that a 1933 Federal
District Court adjudication of relative rights to the Gallinas, the "Hope
Decree," was res judicata because the Public Service Company's
predecessors were parties and because Las Vegas's attorneys appeared
and did not object to the allocation, stating rather that the city, the town,
and their inhabitants were "the real appropriators and entitled to the
appropriation" decreed to the suppliers.276 Next, appellants maintained
that the town of Las Vegas obtained its 1860 title confirmation from the
U.S. Congress only through the Baca heirs' waiver of their prior land
grant, rather than via the pueblo right.277 Finally, they argued that
recognition of the doctrine and further pueblo grants would disrupt the
water rights of thousands of people in the Rio Grande 'Valley.7 8
Nevertheless, in the 1958 decision of Cartwright v. Public Service
Co., a three-two majority of the New Mexico Supreme Court broadly
upheld the town of Las Vegas's pueblo right to take as much water as it
needed.279 The justices ruled that the Hope Decree was not res judicata
as to the town because it had not been properly served and its attorney's
statements at the Hope hearing did not constitute an appearance.2" The
majority also sloughed off the 1821 Baca claim by asserting that
congressional confirmation of the Las Vegas title was sufficient to
establish its validity as a Mexican grant.28' On the key issue, the court
noted the pueblo doctrine's expansive scope and long duration in
California and considered that the reasons for its application there
applied with equal force in New Mexico.282 The majority asserted that
there were no questions of water priority when the colony was
established because there were no other users.283 Waxing poetic, the
justices explained that as the settlement grew, the colonists "carried with
them the torch of priority as long as there was available water to supply
276. Appellants' Reply Brief at 5-7, 38, Cartwright (No. 6172). Appellants also made the related
argument that the Public Service Company failed to mention the alleged p ieblo title when applying
to the State Engineer for a dam permit. Id. at 29-34, 37-38.
277. Id. at 10-15.
278. Id. at 39.
279. Cartwright, 343 P.2d at 654.
280. Id. at 660-62.
281. Id. at 664.
282. Id. at 668.
283. Id.
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the life blood of the expanded community." '284 The court credited the
eighteenth-century Plan of Pitic with inaugurating pueblo rights under
the King of Spain's authority."' Its emphasis on applying the pueblo
doctrine led the majority to neglect potential effects on other users; it was
content to assert that the doctrine was justified under the police power as
an "elevation of the public good over the claim of a private right."28 6
Dissenting justices Federici and McGhee took the majority to task for
distorting history and ignoring public policy. They viewed California
pueblo rights as based on a stretching of Hispanic law, on land title
decisions rather than on water precedent, and on legislative enactment.287
Contrary to the assertion that Las Vegas had water use priority in an
unoccupied area, the 1821 Baca grantees had preceded the pueblo's
founding by fourteen years. 8 Unlike the majority, the dissenters quoted
the specific provisions of the Plan of Pitic requiring common water
sharing between town residents and outsiders and barring use by any
individual to the detriment of others.289 Finally, the dissent criticized the
court's policy decision to ignore "the rural water users with older and
prior rights which are just as vital to them as they may be to a growing
metropolis that would snuff them out without reasonable
compensation."
20
Both supporters and critics of the pueblo doctrine reacted quickly to
the Cartwright decision. The city commission chairman of Albuquerque,
a city founded via a 1706 Spanish grant, hailed the ruling as presaging
future growth and commented that "Los Angeles and San Diego could
never have grown to the metropolises they are if it had not been for the
pueblo rights doctrine."29' On the other hand, law professor Robert
Emmet Clark criticized the majority for relying on "uncertain historical
284. Id.
285. Id. at 669. The 1789 Plan was the official Spanish model for new settlements on the
northern frontier, and in fact provided for water sharing between town residents and non-residents.
See discussion supra note 108.
286. Cartwright, 343 P.2d at 669.
287. Id. at 678. See generally supra note 144 (discussing the influence of Hart v. Burnett, the San
Francisco land case, on Lux v. Haggin); supra text accompanying note 99 (discussing the 1874
legislation approving Los Angeles's charter amendment granting an exclusive right to the Los
Angeles River).
288. Cartwright, 343 P.2d at 675.
289. Id. at 676-77 (quoting Plan of Pitic, §§ 7, 19 (1789)). The dissent's reading of the Plan is
consistent with that of the professional historians who have analyzed it. See Dobkins, supra note 9,
at 101; Hundley, supra note 8, at 39-40; Meyer, supra note 8, at 35-36.
290. Cartwright, 343 P.2d at 680.
291. Sanchez Hails Court's Water Rights Ruling, Albuquerque J., Dec. 13, 1958, at 1, 4.
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premises" and "hortatory expressions."'2 92  Similarly, agricultural
researcher Wells Hutchins criticized the decision for its "public good"
rationale, writing that "[w]ater is no less the lifeblood of a small farming
community or single establishment than of a growing city." '293 More
recent scholars have echoed Clark's and Hutchins's criticisms of
Cartwright as historically flawed and harmful to other users.2 94 In the
latest study of the Las Vegas grant, Malcolm Ebright argues that the
Cartwright majority unfairly exaggerated the contemporary
municipality's water rights because the justices were "misinformed"
about the true nature of Hispanic settlement in the area.295 Ebright shows
that Las Vegas was not a discrete pueblo to which an exclusive right
could attach, but rather a series of communities scattered along the
Gallinas River." 6 However, the majority's lack of access to this
additional historical material does not explain its decision, for the case
file and dissent demonstrate that the supreme court was presented with
ample evidence contradicting any pueblo right, which the justices simply
chose to disregard.
Possibly because of the ensuing controversy, New Mexico courts have
not yet extended the doctrine to cities other than Las Vegas. When a trial
court invoked the pueblo right to excuse Albuquerque from compliance
with State Engineer groundwater appropriation regulations, the supreme
court reversed, holding that there was no jurisdiction over the issue in a
State Engineer proceeding.297 Until 1994, Cartwright has remained good
law as applied to Las Vegas. This year, a New Mexico appellate court
declined to follow it, holding that Las Vegas has no pueblo right." 8 As
this Article goes to press, the state supreme court has just granted Las
292. Robert Emmet Clark, The Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico, 35 N.M. Hist. Rev. 265,
279 (1960).
293. Hutchins, supra note 12, at 762. Hutchins also noted that, traditionally, American cities
acquired water rights by purchase or condemnation, rather than confiscation as here. Id. at 761.
294. See Anastasia S. Stevens, Pueblo Water Rights in New Mexico, 28 Nat. Resources J. 535,
581-83 (1988); Tyler, supra note 8, at 13; Ebright, supra note 86, at 196-200. See generally Iris
H.W. Engstrand, Introduction to Tyler, supra note 8, at 9-10 (summarizing literature on the New
Mexico pueblo water right).
295. Ebright, supra note 86, at 182.
296. Id. at 199.
297. City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73, 76-77 (N.M. 1962). The court reasoned that
if the city really had an absolute right to the water which it had applied to appropriate, there was no
action required on the State Engineer's part. Id. at 76.
298. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, No. 14,647, slip. op. at 16 (N.M. Ct. App., July
15, 1994). In a brief opinion, the court noted that recent scholarship had shown the pueblo doctrine
to be historically invalid, there were practical difficulties in continuing to recognize it, and Las
Vegas had not reasonably relied on Cartwright for any use to which it had put water. Id.
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Vegas's petition for writ of certiorari.299 Under New Mexico's water
adjudication statute, all claims to a particular stream system must be
comprehensively determined;3" but because of the pueblo doctrine's
absolute and expanding nature, most Gallinas users cannot receive an
equitable distribution unless the supreme court affirms the appellate
opinion, thus overruling Cartwright."'
With Cartwright, New Mexico entered the pueblo water rights debate
on the California side. As in the Los Angeles and San Diego cases, the
New Mexico Supreme Court knowingly ignored or distorted historical
evidence, such as the Plan of Pitic. The court's hyperbolic
language-for instance, "the torch of priority"--shows the persistence of
an idealized notion of the Hispanic past. Also like the California pueblo
decisions, Cartwright facilitated the urban accumulation of water
resources at the expense of less powerful interests, in this case small
farmers. °" The extension of the doctrine beyond California can be seen
as a legitimation of water monopolization by metropolitan areas. 3
C. Texas
Texas is the only state where pueblo water rights have never been
recognized, providing a contrast to the lack of serious historical analysis
by courts in California and New Mexico. The case repudiating pueblo
water rights concerned the City of Laredo, officially established on the
banks of the Rio Grande River in 1767. 3o  When the Texas Water
Commission adjudicated water rights to the Middle Rio Grande among
various users in the 1970s, Laredo claimed a pueblo right superior to that
299. State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, No. 14,647, slip op. (N.M. Ct. App., July 15,
1994), cert. granted (N.M. Aug. 26, 1994) (No. 22,283).
300. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-4-17 (Michie 1985).
301. Telephone Interviews with Peter White, Special Assistant Attorney General, New Mexico
State Engineer Office (Feb. 4, 1994; Aug. 15, 1994; Aug. 29, 1994).
302. See also Ebright, supra note 86, at 200 (discussing the vulnerability of Gallinas irrigators to
increases in Las Vegas's water consumption).
303. Between 1960 and 1980 the municipal share of total water consumption in the four
Southwestern states of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah almost quadrupled, while
irrigation and other rural uses remained approximately the same. F. Lee Brown & Helen M. Ingram,
Water and Poverty in the Southwest 14-15 (1987).
304. Cruz, supra note 80, at 96. The town was originally settled in 1755, but its land title was not
surveyed and confirmed by a Spanish royal commission until 1767. Id. at 93-98.
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of any prior appropriator or riparian landowner.3 05  The Commission
refused to recognize Laredo's right, and a state trial co-art affirmed.0 6
In the Texas Court of Appeals, Laredo relied ort the romanticized
characterization of history that had been so successful in the California
and New Mexico cases. The city maintained that the Spanish had given
special prerogatives to towns "back to time immemorial,""3 7 citing
William Hammond Hall's assertion that Valencia traditionally had the
right to limit water access by upstream users.308 Laredo claimed that its
1767 land grant entitled it to a pueblo water right, and that its modem
Public Service Board was "the direct lineal descendant from the earliest
methods employed to obtain water from the Rio Grande."' 9  It also
referred to the Plan of Pitic, though omitting, as had the Cartwright
majority, the provisions requiring apportionment. 310  As to legal
precedent, the city noted that, while no case had yet ruled against the
pueblo right, the California and New Mexico courts had consistently
upheld it.31' Since Laredo had been a pueblo similar to Los Angeles and
subject to the same Hispanic laws, it arguably should also have a
paramount and expanding right.312
Unlike previous courts, the Texas Court of Appeals emphatically
rejected the pueblo doctrine in the 1984 case of In re Contests of the City
of Laredo."' Examining the law applicable to New Spain, the justices
found an emphasis on common water use by all inhabitants and no
305. In re Contests of City of Laredo, 675 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). Other water
users in this area included the cities of Del Rio and Eagle Pass, several smaller communities, and
those requiring water for industrial, irrigation, and recreational purposes. Id. See also Doug Caroom
& Paul Elliott, Water Rights Adjudication-Texas Style, 44 Tex. BJ. 1183 (1981) (discussing water
allocation under the Water Rights Adjudication Act of 1967, Tex. Water Code Ann. §§ 11.301-.341
(West 1988)).
306. Laredo, 675 S.W.2d at 259.
307. Appellant's Brief at 9, Laredo (No. 13,917-B).
308. John Caughey, The Pueblo Water Right of Laredo Historically Coisidered at 16-17; In re
The Adjudication of Water Rights of the Middle Rio Grande and Contributing Texas Tributaries
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 19, 1982) (No. 233,018-93) (citing Hall, supra note 65, at 355-432). This
account is inconsistent with Thomas Glick's painstaking research on the medieval water partition
between Valencia and upstream villages on the Guadalaviar River. See Glick, Valencia, supra note
10, at 118-20.
309. Brief of Appellant-Claimant at 2-3, Laredo (No. 13,917-B).
310. Id. at 17-18. See discussion supra text accompanying note 289.
311. Appellant's Brief at 18-24, Laredo (No. 13,917-B).
312. Id. at 22-25.
313. Laredo, 675 S.W.2d at 257. The decision was made unanimously by a three-judge panel.
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reference to any paramount water right.1 4 Laredo's 1767 land grant did
not purport expressly to grant any water right to the pueblo.31 5 Nor under
the Texas Supreme Court's 1962 decision in State v. Valmont
Plantations"1 6 did the holder of an Hispanic riparian land grant have any
implied irrigation right. 7  The court criticized the California and New
Mexico decisions for their lack of historical basis, including their
mischaracterization of the Plan of Pitic.318 The court therefore held that
Laredo had no pueblo water right, express or implied, and that the
319Commission's allocation was appropriate.
Texas's clear rejection of the pueblo doctrine, despite appeals to an
idealized tradition, sets it apart from California and New Mexico. Recent
scholars of Hispanic water law in the Southwest have applauded the
Laredo decision for more rigorously evaluating the historical evidence.320
Though the court did not explicitly address policy issues, its ruling
removed an obstacle to equitable apportionment among users in future
water adjudications.
Our comparative discussion of the pueblo water right in three states
suggests some observations about the doctrine's meaning in American
legal history. As an absolute and exclusive power sphere, purportedly
based on objective truth, the pueblo right fits the model of formalism
used by some legal historians to describe late nineteenth-century
jurisprudence. The fact that the doctrine was invented and expanded in
the face of evidence documenting its historical falsity supports a
formalist analysis that the courts deliberately fostered a myth to
314. Id. at 265-66. In its argument to the court, the Texas Water Commission had utilized the
testimony of historian Betty Dobkins, author of The Spanish Element in Texas Water Law (1959), to
the effect that disputes between pueblos and other users, such as missions, were resolved "by
deciding what was best for common good." Appellees' Reply at 11-13, Laredo (No. 13,917).
315. Laredo, 675 S.W.2d at 266. See also Hall, supra note 12, at 1-31 to 1-32 (discussing legal
historians' divergent views as to whether Hispanic water rights arose by explicit grant, implication,
or custom).
316. Valmont Plantations v. State, 355 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1962).
317. Laredo, 675 S.W.2d at 266. Located on the banks of the Rio Grande, Laredo was of course a
riparian owner. See also infra part IV (discussing riparian irrigation rights under Hispanic law and
American judicial interpretation). The lack of any express or implied water right is consistent with
Hans Baade's scholarly conclusion that prior to Laredo's founding the land allocated for the
settlement had been determined unfit for irrigation. See Baade, supra note 9, at 82.
318. Laredo, 675 S.W.2d at 269-70. The justices quoted Wells Hutchins's disapproval of the
California cases for failing to cite historical authority, and of the New Mexico Supreme Court for
following California uncritically in Cartwright. Id. (quoting Hutchins, supra note 12, at 757-60).
319. Id. at 270.
320. See Baade, supra note 9, at 82-83; Engstrand, supra note 294, at 2; Hall, supra note 12, at
1-31 to 1-32.
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legitimate resource monopolization.32' On the other hand, the theory that
judges were attempting to protect public rights seems inapplicable.3"
Notwithstanding the New Mexico Supreme Court's invocation of the
police power, Cartwright and the California decisions benefited only a
limited sector of the public by preferring certain cities to all other users.
The pueblo right's survival, despite its historical inaccuracy and
negative policy ramifications, attests to the durability of nineteenth-
century cultural and legal constructs. For example, William Kahrl's
otherwise comprehensive study of California's development, Water and
Power (1982), uncritically accepts the doctrine as fact.323 In 1993, San
Juan Capistrano, California, filed a protest with the State Water
Resources Control Board against a proposed desalting project which
would draw from local streams supplying the city.324 The city claimed
potential injury to its pueblo water right as a successor to a Spanish
mission and town, citing William Hammond Hall and the San Fernando
case.325 Though the Water Board has not yet ruled on the protest,326 the
persistence of these romantic images shows that a century of intentional
judicial distortion of Hispanic law is not easily discardrd.
IV. RIPARIAN IRRIGATION RIGHTS IN TEXAS
Like the pueblo doctrine, a riparian landowner's automatic right to
irrigate from a stream abutting or within his property was a judicially
idealized version of Hispanic law. Such a concept did not obtain in
actual Spanish or Mexican law, which required an express or implied
conveyance from the sovereign for any irrigation rights to exist.3 27
321. This interpretation is clearly inconsistent with those of previous scholars who have attempted
to explain the origins of the pueblo doctrine. See Hundley, supra note 8, at 134 (asserting that
Hispanic legal documentation was not presented to the courts), and Baide, supra note 9, at 87
(claiming that American judges lacked Hispanic legal knowledge).
322. Cf. Scheiber, supra note 24, at 225, 240; Selvin, supra note 24, t 219-25 (describing the
pueblo doctrine as exemplifying a judicial focus on public rights).
323. William L. Kahrl, Water and Power 7 (1982). Kahrl asserts that "[u]nder Spanish colonial
policy, the pueblo was invested with an exclusive right to the water of the river." Id.
324. Capistrano Valley Water District, Protest Based on Injury to Vested Rights, Water Right
Application No. 30,123 (Mar. 23, 1993).
325. Len Hall, Town's Water Rights Claim Stirs Up Torrent ofAnger, L.A. Times, Feb. 23, 1993,
at A3; Letter from Michele A. Staples, Esq. to Edward C. Anton, State 'Water Resources Control
Board (Mar. 18, 1993).
326. See Letter from Edward C. Anton, State Water Resources Contol Board, to Susan M.
Trager, Esq. (Apr. 8, 1993) (requesting additional information to support the protest).
327. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 330-31.
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Nevertheless, Texas precedent allowed riparian irrigation on former
Hispanic land grants from 1926 to 1962, and court documents indicate
that the judiciary was aware of the distortion. As with pueblo rights, the
riparian irrigation doctrine facilitated water monopolization, in this case
by the owners of large riparian estates. Ultimately, the Texas courts
reversed direction with the use of more conscientious historical analysis.
Riparian irrigation in Texas is inextricably related to the history of
Spanish and Mexican land grants. In the 1730s, Spain awarded the first
such grants to the settlers of San Antonio, and the system was expanded
to the Rio Grande Valley in 1750.328 The Mexican government
manifested its policy of encouraging frontier colonization through further
alienation of the public domain, and by the time of Texas's independence
from Mexico in 1836, some 26.2 million acres had been granted to
private parties.329  Land grants were classified for pricing purposes
according to usage, with express or implied irrigation rights
accompanying only certain agricultural plots (tierras de pan lievar), and
not grazing (tierras de ganado) or dry farming lands (tierras de
temporal).330 Since future use rather than location determined whether
irrigation would be permitted, a grant's riverfront site did not signify
irrigation water rights.3 '
328. See Gerald E. Poyo, The Canary Islands Immigrants of San Antonio: From Ethnic
Exclusivity to Community in Eighteenth-Century Bdxar, in Tejano Origins in Eighteenth Century
San Antonio 41, 43-45 (Gerald L. Poyo & Gilberto M. Hinojosa eds., 1991) (discussing grants to
soldiers and civilians around La Villa de San Fernando, San Antonio's predecessor pueblo. The
deeds did not automatically include irrigation rights.); Herbert E. Bolton, Texas in the Middle
Eighteenth Century 299-301 (1915) (discussing the first private Rio Grande grants, used primarily
for stockraising).
329. Thomas Lloyd Miller, The Public Lands of Texas, 1519-1970 15-24 (1972). The acreage
figure includes land granted both by the Spanish and Mexican governments, and constitutes
approximately 11% of the modem state of Texas. Id. at 24.
330. Baade, supra note 9, at 63-64; Dobkins, supra note 9, at 125-30; Meyer, supra note 8, at
124-31; White & Wilson, supra note 12, at 389,421. Baade and Dobkins argue that irrigation water
rights could only be obtained by express sovereign grant, while Meyer maintains that grants within
the limited category of irrigable cropland implied water rights even if they did not so specify. See
also Hall, supra note 12, at 1-31 to 1-33 (usefully summarizing three scholarly interpretations of
how water access was acquired: express sovereign grant; some other sovereign transfer, including
implied irrigation rights; and customary use).
331. Baade, supra note 9, at 64; Dobkins, supra note 9, at 143-44; Meyer, supra note 8, at
119-20. According to Meyer, a riparian grant, without additional authorization, only entitled the
owner to domestic water use. Id. at 120. A survey of Spanish and Mexican grant documents in the
Texas General Land Office revealed that approximately 95% were classified as non-irrigable, even
though situated on rivers or streams. White & Wilson, supra note 12, at 389, 392. Hans Baade
provides an explanation for the lack of riparian irrigation: Hispanic period irrigation was only
conducted by gravity, so water needed to be led to fields significantly lower than, and necessarily far
from, the diversion point. Baade, supra note 9, at 58.
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The independent Republic of Texas (1836-1845) adopted the common
law in 1840, but specifically exempted land grant and colonization law
from its operation.3" Texas was annexed by the United States in 1845,
and the land grant exception, together with the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo's guarantee of property rights in the former Mexican
territories,333 established Hispanic law as governing pre-1840 land titles
and any appurtenant water rights.334 Between 1840 and 1889, land
alienated from the public domain carried common-law riparian rights,
and, after 1889, all unappropriated waters became subject to prior
appropriation (after 1895 in non-arid areas). 35 As la:-ge-scale irrigation
developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, disputes
ensued between riparian proprietors and prior appropriators, and the
Texas judiciary was faced with the necessity of harmonizing the different
water regimes.336
The Texas Supreme Court addressed this conflict in its 1926 Motl v.
Boyd decision,337  with significant consequences for Hispanic law
interpretation. Motl involved prior appropriators (plaintiffs Motl and
others) whose predecessors had been allowed by the predecessor of two
riparian owners (defendants Boyd and White) to build a dam and
reservoir for irrigation purposes on the riparian property.338 In 1857, the
state of Texas had granted the property to the predecessors of Boyd and
White, and the dam was built in 1886. When defendants purchased the
332. Law of Jan. 20, 1840, § 2, 1840 Tex. Gen. Laws 3, 4, 2 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas
177, 178 (1898).
333. Article VIII, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922, 929-30 (1848).
334. Dobkins, supra note 9, at 27-28. As a result of the treaty, valid land claims had to be
respected in the southern strip of Texas between the Nueces and Rio Grande rivers (including the
Rio Grande Valley), an area which the Republic of Texas had claimed but never controlled. Galen
D. Greaser & Jesus de la Teja, Quieting Title to Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in the Trans-
Nueces: The Bourland and Miller Commission, 1850-1852, 45 Sw. Hist. Q. 445, 447 (1992). It
should be noted that although Hispanic law now applied to pre-1840 titles, most of the original
owners eventually lost their land to Anglos due to litigation expenses, taxation, and fluctuations in
the cattle market. David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986 38,
51-53 (1987). See also Paul Taylor, An American-Mexican Frontier, Nueces County, Texas 179-80
(1934) (noting that all fifteen Spanish and Mexican grants in Nueces County, constituting the
county's entire land area, had been deeded to Americans by 1883).
335. Baade, supra note 9, at 4-8. Ultimately, the 1967 Water Right,-. Adjudication Act, Tex.
Water Code Ann. §§ 11.303-.341 (West 1988) was passed to settle water claims comprehensively to
all streams.
336. Dobkins, supra note 9, at 139-40.
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tract in 1920, they applied to the state board of water engineers to divert
storm waters from the dam in order to irrigate, but were denied
permission.34 They began pumping water anyway, and plaintiffs sued to
enjoin any further diversions.341
The trial court granted an injunction against defendants, although it
allowed them to take water running over plaintiffs' dam.342 An
intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that under riparian
"reasonable use" doctrine a prior appropriator could not divest riparian
rights without either condemning the riparian lands or paying
compensation.343 Neither the trial court nor the appellate court addressed




On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the parties focused largely on
the conflict between appropriative and riparian principles.345 The
plaintiffs, now appellants, argued that their appropriation was consistent
with the state's sovereign power, delegated to the board of water
engineers, to distribute water for irrigation and prevent diversions of
already appropriated streams.346 If only riparian landowners were
allowed a property interest in abutting waters, the consequences would
be alarming for the "thousands of acres" that had "been put into
cultivation dependent upon water for irrigation."347 Supporting this
position in an amicus brief, the Markham Irrigation Company presented
documentary evidence that water usage was communal under Hispanic
law, and that neither Spanish nor Mexican legislation expressly granted
riparian water rights.34  Nor could any implied grant of irrigation be
340. Id. at 462.
341. Id. at 460.
342. Id.
343. Boyd v. Motl, 236 S.W.2d 487, 494-95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1922). The court also found that the
appropriation had never been properly noticed or filed, and that the state board's denial of
defendants' diversion application could not preclude them from obtaining a judicial adjudication of
their riparian rights. Id. at 493,496.
344. This is perfectly explicable because the land in question was not a pre-1840 grant, but was
held under an 1857 Texas patent. Mot!, 286 S.W.2d at 460.
345. See Brief and Argument for Plaintiffs in Error at 7-15, Motl (No. 3740) (arguing for prior
appropriation); and Brief and Argument for Defendants in Error at 6-1I, Mot! (No. 3740) (claiming
riparian rights).
346. Brief and Argument for Plaintiffs in Error at 8, 10-11, Mot! (No. 3740).
347. Id. at 61.
348. Argument on Behalf of Markham Irrigation Co. et al. at 4-5, Mot (No. 3740).
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assumed, "because the present extent of irrigation could not have been
comprehended." '349
The defendants, now respondents, maintained that riparian principles,
including irrigation "as a necessary natural use," were fmnly established
in Texas, and that the board of engineers could not divest them of rights
they held by virtue of their 1857 patent.350 Before the appellate court, the
respondents had taken refuge in a romanticized riparianism, claiming to
represent
those owners of yet unimproved lands, bordering o:a these beautiful
streams, who dream of a time when in their old age they may come
to this land, improve it and under the restful shade of the great
pecans and in sight of this beautiful water, may build little homes
where they can spend the evening of life beyond the strife and
turmoil of the City and business cares.35'
According to the respondents, all the non-riparian proprietors needing
irrigation were mere "special interests."352
Chief Justice Calvin Cureton, writing the Motl v. Boyd opinion for a
unanimous Supreme Court in 1926,313 found a way to validate
riparianism and even trace it back to Hispanic law, while still ruling for
the appropriators.354 The court held that all land grantees from the
Mexican period until 1889 received appurtenant -irrigation rights.355
Cureton buttressed this position by quoting from Frederic Hall's 1885
treatise, The Laws of Mexico, which stated that non-navigable streams
passing through properties could be used by the owners "for the utility of
their farms or industry," and if passing between tracts could be used by
each owner for "the irrigation of his estate or any other object. '35 6 The
only limitation on riparian rights was that they did not attach to flood
waters. 357  After pronouncing this broad riparian principle, the justices
349. Id. at 20. This description of Hispanic period irrigation realities is consistent with Hans
Baade's technological explanation for the lack of riparian irrigation. See dkscussion supra note 331.
350. Brief and Argument for Defendants in Error at 7, 10, Motl (No. 3740).
351. Brief and Argument for Appellants at 43, Boyd (No. 6447).
352. Brief and Argument for Defendants in Error at 78, Mot! (No. 3740).
353. As Attorney General of Texas, Cureton had represented the state in the Red River boundary
dispute with Oklahoma, and then served as Chief Justice from 1921 to 1940. Dobkins, supra note 9,
at 140-41 n.48.
354. Mot, 286 S.W. at 458.
355. Id. at 467. Cureton began with the Mexican regime because tha 1823 Colonization Law
specifically mentioned the distribution of lands suitable for irrigation. Id. tt 463.
356. Id. at 465 (quoting Hall, supra note 191, §§ 1388, 1391).
357. Id. at 468.
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nevertheless decided for appellants on an estoppel theory, because the
respondents' predecessor "had in effect conveyed their riparian
waters." '358 The court thus reinstated the trial court's ruling that the
appellants were entitled to all of the stream's ordinary flow.359
Legal historians have criticized Motl for mischaracterizing Hispanic
law and for its policy ramifications. In 1955, A.R. White and Will
Wilson offered the first and most comprehensive argument, based on
Spanish and Mexican documents, that no vested riparian irrigation right
had ever existed.36 White and Wilson noted that, when citing Hall's
treatise, Chief Justice Cureton omitted passages requiring that any
irrigation be "[w]ithout prejudice to the common use" and consistent
with "ordinances and customs."36' In any event, Cureton's holding was
dicta on Hispanic law, because the land at issue was granted in 1857
under state rather than prior sovereign authority, and the estoppel point
was ultimately controlling.362 Finally, White and Wilson observed that
the decision restricted water utilization and statewide prosperity.363 More
recent scholars have largely echoed these criticisms," with Hans Baade
buttressing them through additional documentary research.365
All of these critics have attributed Motl's errors to the Texas
judiciary's lack of Hispanic legal knowledge. According to White and
Wilson, the court did not have before it "the applicable law and the facts
necessary for its interpretation." 366 Betty Dobkins relates that "[b]y early
statehood the pioneer spirit in Texas law was dying out, and familiarity
with the Spanish law was declining. 367  Joseph McKnight similarly
asserts that "[t]he thread of Hispanic learning, once gained, seems
however to have been lost in the period following the Civil War."368 As
358. Id. at 476-77.
359. Id. at 477.
360. White & Wilson, supra note 12, at 389-92, 431-32. White and Wilson found that land was
classified "irrigable" or "not irrigable" for pricing purposes, without regard to whether it was
riparian. Id. at 421.
361. Id. at 382-83 (quoting Hall, supra note 189, §§ 1388, 1389). They also discredited all of the
passages from Hall as translations from Escriche, who was reciting views derived from French rather
than Spanish law. Id. at 383-84.
362. Id. at 427, 432.
363. Id. at 432.
364. See Dobkins, supra note 9, at 102-46; McKnight, supra note 13, at 380-86.
365. See Baade, supra note 9.
366. White & Wilson, supra note 12, at 433.
367. Dobkins, supra note 9, at 133.
368. McKnight, supra note 13, at 374.
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recently as 1986, Hans Baade quoted McKnight's comment and applied
it to the California courts as well.
3 69
But the documentary evidence presented to the Motl court indicates
that the Texas judiciary was well aware that it was inventing Hispanic
law on riparian irrigation. Seen in this light, the court's disregard of key
passages from Hall's treatise may demonstrate deliberate distortion as
much as lack of knowledge. Though the justices' estoppel ruling was
probably correct, their attempt to justify the decision by idealizing
history prevented fair water adjudication in Texas for years to come.
Following the Mot decision, Texas courts and commentators
enshrined the idea of Hispanic riparian irrigation. In Manry v. Robison37
the Texas Supreme Court held that abandoned river beds were the
property of the riparian owners,37' citing Mot for the proposition that
Mexican law guaranteed the riparian rights of land grant holders.372
Other cases employed Mot to support the application of Hispanic law to
pre-1840 grants373 and the riparian owner's right to use his proportionate
water share on his land.374 A major treatise on Texas water law averred
that Motl "correctly stated the Law of Riparian Rights as applied to
navigable, or 'public' rivers as it has been recognized... by the Spanish
law in America." '375 During the long-standing dispute between riparians
and prior appropriators, Motl was so often quoted by riparian advocates
that, according to one scholar, "the concept of a Spanish 'riparian right'
had become ingrafted in the legal mind in Texas. 3 76
This conflict came to a head in the late 1950s, with the massive
Valmont377 litigation over water rights to the lower Rio Grande River.3
369. Baade, supra note 9, at 23, 87.
370. Maury v. Robison, 56 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1932).
371. Id. at 449.
372. Id. at 443 (citing Mot v. Boyd, 286 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. 1926)).
373. Miller v. Letzerich, 49 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. 1932) (citing Motd, 286 S.W. at 458).
374. Texas Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 276 (Tex. 1927) (citing Motd, 286 S.W. at 458).
375. J. Harbert Davenport & J.T. Canales, The Texas Law Of Flowing Maters 64-65 (1949).
376. Garland F. Smith, The Valley Water Suit and its Impact on Texas Water Policy: Some
Practical Advice for the Future, Tex. Tech L. Rev. 577, 590 (1977). SLpporters of both positions
presented papers on Hispanic riparian irrigation at a series of water law conferences held at the
University of Texas in 1952, 1954, and 1955. Id. at 595-606. At the conferences, Davenport and
Canales represented the extreme riparian position, and White and Wilson maintained, contrary to
Mot, that no automatic irrigation right existed in the Hispanic period. Dobkins, supra note 9, at
148-155.
377. State v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 878 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961), opinion adopted,
355 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1962).
378. See Smith, supra note 376, for an overview of these lawsuits.
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The State of Texas and numerous water districts, as appropriators, sued
landowners who were claiming riparian irrigation rights derived from
Spanish and Mexican grants.379 At stake was the water supply of cities,
non-riparian proprietors, and two million acres of land abutting the river
below the Falcon reservoir.38 The plaintiffs argued that there were no
appurtenant irrigation rights, while defendants contended that such rights
arose under Hispanic law, Texas's patenting of grants, and Motl.38'
In a ninety-six-page opinion, the trial court held that riparian irrigation
rights attached to the lands in question under Mod and stare decisis.382
Significantly, the judge issued this ruling despite his explicit factual
finding that Hispanic law required a specific grant from the sovereign.3"3
He conceded that he was obligated to abide by prior rulings, "regardless
of whatever reasons may be assigned for such decisions."3 4 Like the
California Supreme Court in San Fernando, the Valmont trial judge
viewed stare decisis as controlling, although he admitted he was
contravening the documentary record.
In State v. Valmont Plantations, a panel of the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals decided to reexamine Hispanic law, overrule Motd, and
reverse.3"5 Writing for the panel's majority, Justice Jack Pope squarely
held that "the Spanish and Mexican grants along the lower Rio Grande
did not carry with them appurtenant irrigation rights."3 6 Through an
analysis of Hispanic documents, the majority found that the grants did
not expressly include irrigation access, and that from the land
classifications, quantities granted, prices, and physical difficulty of
riparian irrigation, there were no implied rights on the Rio Grande
either.387 Of all the sources, only Escriche suggested the possibility of
riparian irrigation, but the court considered that he was merely airing his
personal views and that his summary of the law was derived from French
rather than Spanish water codes.88 Though Mod cited many of the same
documents and treatises analyzed in Valmont, the former court made
379. Valmont, 346 SAV.2d at 854.
380. Smith, supra note 376, at 590.
381. Dobkins, supra note 9, at 159.
382. Valmont, 346 S.W.2d at 854 & n.2.
383. Id.
384. Opinion at 34, State of Texas v. Valmont Plantations, No. B-20791 (Hidalgo County Dist.
Ct. 1959), quoted in Dobkins, supra note 9, at 161.
385. Valmont, 346 S.W.2d at 853.
386. Id. at 855.
387. Id. at 878.
388. Id. at 868-69.
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erroneous assumptions about Hispanic law, and i any event these
statements were dicta because the case involved only grantees of the state
of Texas.389 One justice dissented, maintaining that Motl was "one of the
celebrated cases rendered by the Supreme Court and should not lightly
be disregarded. 3 9
The Texas Supreme Court adopted the majority's opinion, lauding
Pope's analysis as "exhaustive and well documented." '391 Again one
justice dissented, in language reminiscent of the pueblo decisions,
referring to Mot as a "rule of property" upon which riparian owners had
relied "to irrigate their fertile fields and orchards. '3t2 But the days of
romantic riparianism were over in Texas.
The Valmont decision had important ramifications for water policy
and Hispanic law jurisprudence. In the lower Rio Grande controversy,
the ruling removed the vested riparian rights that had obstructed fair
allocation among all users, enabling later courts to establish a system of
weighted priorities based on perfected filings and previous irrigation.393
The Texas legislature also enacted the 1967 Water Rights Adjudication
Act to allocate water access to whole streams and thus avoid piecemeal
litigation.394 Ultimately, the Texas courts extended Valmont's conclusion
beyond the Rio Grande to all perennial and then to all non-perennial
streams.3 95 Valmont also influenced the holding in Laredo that former
Hispanic pueblos had no express or implied water rights.396 Legal
historians have acclaimed Valmont as a refreshing contrast to Mod,
although they attribute the reversal to a renaissance of Hispanic legal
learning without assessing the deliberateness of past distortions."'
389. Id. at 879-81.
390. Id. at 883.
391. Valmont Plantations v. State, 355 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. 1962).
392. Id. at 505.
393. State v. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 18,443 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1969). See also Smith, supra note 376, at 624-28 (discussing the weighted priority
system).
394. Tex. Water Code Ann. §§ 11.301-.341 (West 1988).
395. In re Adjudication of Water Rights of Cibolo Creek, 568 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978);
In re Adjudication of Water Rights in Medina River Watershed of the Sari Antonio River Basin, 670
S.W.2d 250 (Tex. 1984).
396. In re Contests of City of Laredo, 675 S.W.2d 257,266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). See discussion
supra text accompanying notes 315-17.
397. According to Joseph McKnight, "the revival of learning has been most marked and
productive, causing the state's highest court to pierce the veil of stare decisis in the light of recent
findings of historical research." McKnight, supra note 13, at 374. Hans Baade similarly associates
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The riparian irrigation right's similarities in origin and development to
the pueblo water right make it susceptible to a like legal historical
analysis. Consistent with the formalist model, the doctrine gave riparian
landowners absolute power over their adjacent water, and was
purportedly based on objective historical truth. The Mot court invented
the concept despite the justices' awareness of its falsity, suggesting that it
was deliberately created and maintained by later courts to justify
resource accumulation. This interpretation is inconsistent with that of
the scholars who believe the Mot court merely suffered from a benign
ignorance of Hispanic law. The public rights model is inapplicable,
because the doctrine only benefited large riverbank estates, and in fact
obstructed broader public access until Valmont cleared the way for
comprehensive stream adjudication. Of course, the pueblo and riparian
irrigation stories end differently: California and (until recently) New
Mexico courts have intentionally maintained an idealized jurisprudence
having monopolistic effects, while the Texas judiciary has not.39
V. CONCLUSION
In developing a jurisprudence of Hispanic water rights, southwestern
state courts deliberately distorted historic communal water sharing in
favor of municipal exclusivity and riparian irrigation. Beginning in the
late nineteenth century, California courts elaborated an absolute,
expanding pueblo water right that was also adopted in New Mexico.
Similarly, Texas recognized an automatic riparian irrigation right from
the 1926 Mot case until 1962, when the doctrine was ultimately rejected
in Valmont. Although previous scholars have argued that these judicial
misrepresentations took place because evidence was not presented or
because judges lacked historical knowledge, review of the original case
files reveals that courts repeatedly disregarded ample material on
Hispanic law and custom. The effect of creating these absolute and
exclusive rights was the concentration of water control by certain large
cities and riparian landowners.
the "revival" with the Valmont litigation, as well as with the University of Texas Water Law
Conferences. Baade, supra note 9, at 24.
398. Indeed, the San Fernando trial court cited Valmont as an example of thorough investigation
into Hispanic water law, but was overruled by the California Supreme Court on stare decisis
grounds. Compare Memorandum of Decision at 101, City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando
(Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Mar. 15, 1968) (No. 650,079) with City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1284 (1975).
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Why did judges in these states so manipulate the historical record? In
the first place, many of the case files and decisions reflect the influence
of romantic ideas about the Spanish and Mexican past. Just as the
Mission Inn's promoters and other tourism boosters used images of
missions and ranchos to sell their products, so courts, employed notions
of a pueblo's "torch of priority"399 and an expansive Ffispanic riparianism
to justify water monopolization. Legal formalism was also part of the
late nineteenth-century cultural climate, and encouraged judges to think
of municipal and riparian power as rigidly bounded, absolute constructs.
The formalistic goal of preventing resource redistribution was certainly
advanced by limiting water access to a few large entities. A public rights
explanation is less applicable here, for these courts were focused on
elevating some cities and landowners over all other users rather than on
any general benefit. In this sense the Hispanic law rulings were
consistent with the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century emphasis on
water as an exclusive property right rather than as a resource to be
allocated for the greater good.4"
Why is it so important that southwestern courts deliberately
misrepresented Hispanic law for water accumulation purposes? Legal
historians as far back as Frederic Maitland and as recently as John Reid
have distinguished the function of legal analysis from that of historical
research, maintaining that selective use of documentary evidence is a
well-established practice of lawyers and judges, and should not be
subjected to the standards of professional historians.4"' This "forensic
history," as John Reid has called it, uses the past as precedential
authority rather than factual explanation.4"'
But in southwestern water law, historical accuracy is a legal question,
and one of contemporary resource policy as well. Under the Treaty of
399. Cartwright v. Public Service Co., 343 P.2d 654, 668 (1958).
400. See Freyfogle, supra note 32, at 520-25 (noting that absolute riparian rights in California
limited receptivity to administrative allocation); Pisani, supra note 6, at 37 (arguing that exclusive
prior appropriation in many western states stimulated economic develoiment but worked against
equitable distribution). See also Frances Levine, Dividing the Water: The Impact of Water Rights
Adjudication on New Mexican Communities, 32 J. Sw. 268, 277 (1990) ("The individualized focus
of prior appropriation precludes the community basis for water... !).
401. John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 193, 202, 220 (1993). According
to Maitland, "[t]hat process by which old principles and old phrases are charged with a new content,
is from the lawyer's point of view an evolution of the true intent and meaning of the old law; from
the historian's point of view it is almost of necessity a process of perversion and misunderstanding."
Frederic William Maitland, Why the History of English Law Is Not Written, in 1 The Collected
Papers Of Frederic William Maitland 480,491 (H.A.L. Fisher ed. 1911).
402. Reid, supra note 401, at 217.
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Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States guaranteed that property rights
established under Mexican sovereignty would be respected. 403  Legal
historian Christian Fritz has asserted that American courts
conscientiously attempted to enforce this provision with regard to land
claims, 4 4 and various scholars cited throughout this Article similarly
argue that Hispanic water law was misinterpreted through ignorance
rather than by design. If the pueblo rights doctrine and riparian irrigation
were deliberate distortions of Spanish and Mexican law, American courts
knowingly flouted the treaty's guarantee, casting doubt on the
conventional scholarly view of benign neglect.
Furthermore, the "forensic history" notion that judges can legitimately
misrepresent the past has serious implications for contemporary water
policy. Spanish and Mexican communal water sharing, by which the
needs of various users were apportioned, was a system well-suited to the
arid frontier. °5 Judicial hijacking of this tradition appeared to place the
authority of history behind monopolization of a scarce resource by a few
cities and landowners. Had the more accurate historical arguments
presented to the courts prevailed, southwestern water law would not have
been left a legacy of exclusive water rights that continues to trump fair
distribution in California and New Mexico, as it did for so long in Texas.
If judges had taken history more seriously, they would have been able to
implement the lessons a previous civilization learned about
environmental adaptation rather than indulging unlimited urban and
agricultural expansion.40 6
403. 9 Stat. 922, 929-30 (1848).
404. According to Fritz, judges "mangled the Mexican law," but "clearly were struggling with it,
incorporating what they understood Mexican legal concepts to be, what a pueblo title meant and a
whole variety of other ideas." Bakken et al., supra note 30, at 143. My own future research will
examine U.S. judicial treatment of Hispanic land law.
405. Hundley, supra note 8, at 39, 62; Meyer, supra note 8, at 164.
406. See Bates et al., supra note 6, at 29-36, 40-42, 128 (chronicling how the rapid growth of
cities and large-scale agriculture in the West has resulted in river depletion and degradation).
